THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  FISHER 
Lockwood 


<2{>  990/75 


THE  CAPTURE  OP  FORT  FISHER, 
By  H.C.Lockwood. 


Atlantic 
May-June, 1871. 


Library  of 
The  University  of  North  Carolina 


COLLECTION  OF 

NORTH  CAROLINIANA 


ENDOWED  BY 

JOHN  SPRUNT  HILL 
of  the  Class  of  1889 


lf>Qlo:7S-U&\ 


622 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


cm. 

[May, 
/$7/ 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER. 


FIRST  EXPEDITION. 


HP  HE  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  was 
J-  one  of  the  most  brilliant  naval  and 
military  achievements  of  the  war.  This 
formidable  earthwork  was  situated  on 
Federal  Point,  N.  C,  in  the  depart- 
ment of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina, 
and  was  built  more  particularly  to  guard 
the  entrance  of  New  Inlet,  while  Fort 
Caswell  served  the  same  purpose  in 
respect  to  the  West  Inlet. 

This  department  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major-General  Benjamin  F. 
Butler. 

There  were  other  extensive  fortifica- 
tions on  Smith's  Island  and  on  the 
banks  of  the  Cape  Fear  River.  Al- 
though a  large  and  expensive  blockad- 
ing fleet  was  kept  continually  opposite 
these  inlets,  still,  on  account  of  the  pe- 
culiar formation  of  the  mouth  of  Cape 
Fear  River  and  the  effect  of  storms,  it 
was  next  to  an  impossibility  on  the 
one  hand  to  prevent  the  exportation  of 
cotton  and  other  products  of  the  South, 
and,  on  the  other,  entirely  to  exclude 
foreign  supplies  and  munitions  of  war 
from  the  port  of  Wilmington.  The 
necessity  of  putting  an  end  to  this  illicit 
commerce  with  the  Rebels,  by  the  cap- 
ture of  these  defences  of  Wilmington,- 
had  long  been  urged  upon  the  gov- 
ernment. — 

But  there  were  also  other  great  ob- 
jects to  be  accomplished.  General 
Sherman  was  rapidly  approaching  Sa- 
vannah, and  it  was  believed  that  after 
taking  that  city  he  would  march  to 
Goldsboro,  N.  C.  It  therefore  became 
important  that  the  government  should 
have  possession  of  Wilmington,  so  that 
supplies  might  be  sent  up  the  Cape 
Fear  River. 

The  reduction  of  these  defences 
could  not  be  accomplished  by  the  navy, 
and  "  without  military  aid  and  co-op- 
eration it  could  not  be  effected  or  even 
wisely  attempted."  In  the  fall  of  1864 
the  War  and  Navy  Departments  agreed 


to  organize  a  joint  movement  which 
would  insure  success.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  said  in  his  report,  in  rela- 
tion to  the  naval  branch  of  the  expedi- 
tion, that  "  to  place  that  force  under  the 
command  of  the  first  officer  in  the 
navy  was  a  duty.  Vice-Admiral  Farra- 
gut  was  therefore  selected  to  conduct 
the  enterprise,  but  impaired  health, 
the  result  of  exposure  and  unremitted 
exertions  during  two  years  of  active 
labor  and  unceasing  efforts  in  the  Gulf, 
rendered  it  imprudent  for  that  distin- 
guished and  energetic  officer  to  enter 
upon  this  service."  Admiral  Farragut 
having  declined  to  serve  for  the  rea- 
sons above  stated,  on  the  22d  day  of 
September,  1864,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  detached  Rear-Admiral  D.  D. 
Porter  from  the  command  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi Squadron,  and  ordered  him  to 
proceed  to  Beaufort,  N.  C,  and  relieve 
Acting  Rear-Admiral  S.  P.  Lee,  in 
command  of  the  North  Atlantic  Block- 
ading-Squadron. 

Fort  Fisher  having  been  the  objec- 
tive point  of  the  two  expeditions,  it  may 
not  be  inappropriate  to  add  a  brief  de- 
scription of  it.  ^ 
B!"  "  Fort  Fisher  is  situated  on  the  pe- 
ninsula between  the  Cape  Fear  River  and 
the  Atlantic  Ocean,  about  a  mile  and  a 
half  northeast  of  Federal  Point.  For 
five  miles  north  of  Federal  Point  this 
peninsula  is  sandy  and  low,  not  rising 
more  than  fifteen  feet  above  high  tide, 
the  interior  abounding  in  fresh-water 
swamps,  often  wooded  and  almost  im- 
passable, while  much  of  the  dry  land, 
till  one  gets  within  half  a  mile  of 
Fort  Fisher,  is  covered  with  wood  or 
low  undergrowth,  except  a  strip  about 
three  hundred  yards  wide  along  the 
sea-shore.  t 

'  Fort  Fisher  consists  of  two  fronts, 
—  the  first,  or  land  front,  running  across 
the  peninsula  at  this  point,  seven  hun- 
dred   yards    wide,    is    four    hundred 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2013 


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The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


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and  eighty  yards  in  length  ;  while  the 
second,  or  sea  front,  runs  from  the 
right  of  the  first  parallel  to  the  beach 
to  the  Mound  Battery,  a  distance  of 
thirteen  hundred  yards.  The  land 
front  is  intended  to  resist  any  attack 
from  the  north,  the  sea  front  to  pre- 
vent any  of  our  naval  vessels  from  run- 
ning through  New  Inlet,  or  landing 
troops  on  Federal  Point. 

"  1.  Land  Front.  —  This  front  con- 
sists of  a  half-bastion  on  the  left,  or 
Cape  Fear  River  side,  connected  by  a 
curtain  with  a  bastion  on  the  ocean  side. 
The  parapet  is  twenty-five  feet  thick, 
averages  twenty  feet  in  height,  with 
traverses  rising  ten  feet  above  it  and 
running  back  on  their  tops,  which  were 
from  eight  to  twelve  feet  in  thickness, 
to  a  distance  of  from  thirty  to  forty  feet 
from  the  interior  crest.  The  traverses 
on  the  left  half  bastion  were  about 
twenty-five  feet  in  length  on  the  top. 

"The  earth  for  this' heavy  parapet, 
and  the  enormous  traverses  at  their 
inner  ends,  more  than  thirty  feet  in 
height,  was  obtained  partly  from  a 
shallow  exterior  ditch,  but  mainly  from 
the  interior  of  the  work.  Between 
each  pair  of  traverses  there  was  one 
or  two  guns.  The  traverses  on  the 
right  of  this  front  were  only  partially 
completed.  A  palisade,  which  is  loop- 
holed  and  has  a  banquette,  runs  in  front 
of  this  face  at  a  distance  of  about  fifty 
feet  in  front  of  the  foot  of  the  exterior 
slope  from  the  Cape  Fear  River  to  the 
ocean,  with  a  position  for  a  gun  be- 
tween the  left  of  the  front  and  the 
river,  and  another  between  the  right  of 
the  front  and  the  ocean.  Through  the 
middle  traverse  on  the  curtain  was  a 
bomb-proof  postern,  whose  exterior 
opening  was  covered  by  a  small  redan 
for  two  field-pieces,  to  give  flank  fire 
along  the  curtain.  The  traverses  were 
generally  bomb  -  proofed,  for  men  or 
magazines.  The  slopes  of  the  work 
appear  to  have  been  revetted  with 
marsh  sod,  or  covered  with  grass,  and 
to  have  had  an  inclination  of  forty-five 

degrees,  or  a  little  less There  was 

a  formidable  system  of  torpedoes  two 
hundred  yards  in  advance  of  this  front, 


the  torpedoes  being  about  eighty  feet 
apart  and  each  containing  about  one 
hundred  pounds  of  powder.  They  were 
connected  with  the  fort  by  three  sets 
of  wires 

"  2.  Sea  Front.  —  This  front  con- 
sists of  a  series  of  batteries,  mounting 
in  all  twenty-four  guns,  the  different 
batteries  being  connected  by  a  strong 
infantry  parapet,  so  as  to  form  a  con- 
tinuous line.  The  same  system  of 
heavy  traverses  for  the  protection  of  the 
guns,  is  used  as  on  the  land  front,  and 
these  traverses  are  also  generally  bomb- 
proofed.  It  may  be  added  that,  in  the 
thirty  bomb-proof  magazines  and  the 
passages,  there  were  fourteen  thousand 
five  hundred  feet  of  floor  space,  not  in- 
cluding the  main  magazine,  which  was 
exploded  and  whose  dimensions  are 
unknown."  (See  Report  of  General  C. 
B.  Comstock,  of  General  Grant's  staff, 
dated  Head  -  quarters  United  States 
Forces,  Fort  Fisher,  N.  C,  January  27, 
1865.) 

On  the  6th  of  December,  1864,  Gen- 
eral Grant  wrote  to  General  Butler, 
"  The  details  for  the  execution  are  in- 
trusted to  you  and  the  officers  immedi- 
ately in  command  of  the  troops."  All 
the  troops  which  composed  the  army 
branch  of  both  expeditions  were  drawn 
from  the  Army  of  the  James,  which 
army  was  commanded  by  General  But- 
ler. The  -necessary  marching  orders 
having  been  issued  to  the  troops 
who  were  to  take  part  in  the  expedi- 
tion, Major-General  Benjamin  F.  But- 
ler called  on  Lieutenant-General  U.  S 
Grant  at  his  head  -  quarters  at  City 
Point,  Va.,  on  the  night  of  the  8th  day 
of  December,  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
forming him  of  the  fact.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Comstock  was  here  taken  on 
board  of  General  Butler's  boat.  Gen- 
eral Butler  said  to  the  Lieutenant-Geh- 
eral,  on  taking  his  leave,  "  Now  we 
will  get  off  as  soon  as  we  can,"  and 
"  I  shall  be  before  Fort  Fisher  on  ©r 
about  the  16th  day  of  December,  and  I 
hope  I  shall  be  able  to  present  the  fort 
to  you  as  a  Christmas  present.'' 

As  soon  as  darkness  closed  in  on  the 
7th  day  of  December,   1864,  General 


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The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[May, 


Ames,  with  the  picked  men  of  his  di- 
vision, moved  out  from  their  position 
on  the  New  Market  Road,  followed  by 
General  Paine's  division  of  colored 
troops  and  Captain  R.  L.  Lee's  Battery 
of  Independent  Artillery.  Through  a 
rain-storm  this  column  pressed  on 
across  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Deep 
Bottom,  and  reached  the  signal-tower 
on  the  Appomattox  before  daybreak. 
Here  camp-fires  were  lighted.  The 
probable  object  of  this  was  to  lead  the 
enemy  to  believe  that  we  were  moving 
troops  to  the  left  on  the  Weldon  Rail- 
road. Early  Thursday  morning  the 
line  of  march  was  again  taken  up  for 
Bermuda  Hundreds,  where  the  troops 
were  embarked  on  transports.  On  ac- 
count of  the  draught  of  these  transports, 
many  of  them  were  obliged  to  anchor 
in  the  river  during  the  night,  and  it  was 
Saturday  before  all  the  vessels  had  ar- 
rived in  Hampton  Roads.  The  fol- 
lowing composed  the  army  branch  of 
the  expedition  :  Major-General  Benja- 
min F.  Butler  and  staff,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  C.  B.  Comstock,  of  General 
Grant's  staff,  Major-General  Godfrey 
Weitzel  and  staff  (although  General 
Butler  accompanied  the  expedition  as 
Commanding  General,  still  General 
Weitzel  was  in  the  immediate  command 
of  the  troops),  2d  Division  of  24th  Army 
Corps  under  the  command  of  Brigadier- 
General  Adelbert  Ames,  3d  Division 
of  25th  Army  Corps  under  the  com- 
mand of  Brigadier-General  Charles  J. 
Paine,  and  Captain  R.  L.  Lee  Battery 
of  Independent  Artillery.  These  troops, 
taken  together,  amounted  to  about  six 
thousand  five  hundred  men.  Generals 
Butler  and  Weitzel  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Comstock  made  their  head- 
quarters on  board  of  the  Ben  Deford, 
General  Ames  on  the  Baltic,  and  Gen- 
eral Paine  on  the  Livingston.  The  na- 
val force  consisted  of  thirty-seven  ves- 
sels, five  of  which  were  iron-clads,  and 
a  reserved  force  of  nineteen  vessels. 

On  Saturday,  the  10th  of  December, 
General  Butler  telegraphed  to  General 
Grant  that  he  was  at  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, ready  to  sail  and  waiting  for  the 
navy.     General  Grant  replied  to  this  ; 


"  If  you  do  not  get  off  immediately  you 
will  lose  the  chance  of  surprising  a 
weak  garrison."  The  idea  of  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General  seemed  to  be  that  the 
success  of  the  expedition  depended  on 
the  celerity  of  its  movements  in  order 
to  make  a  surprise.  In  this  he  was  to 
be  disappointed,  for  delay  after  delay 
occurred. 

On  the  13th  of  December  Admiral 
Porter  wrote  General  Butler  that  "the 
rest  of  the  fleet  would  leave  here  in 
three  hours,  and  proceed  to  the  rendez- 
vous, twenty-five  miles  east  of  Cape 
Fear  River."  On  account  of  the  de- 
lay the  expedition  had  become  com- 
mon talk  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  Nor- 
folk. 

General  Butler  being  assured  at  last 
that  the  navy  was  in  readiness  to  sail, 
and  that  several  vessels  had  in  fact  al- 
ready sailed,  and  knowing  that  a  por- 
tion of  the  country  between  the  Poto- 
mac and  the  Rappahannock  Rivers  was 
infested  with  spies  and  scouts,  in  order 
to.  deceive  the  enemy  ordered  his  whole 
fleet  to  get  ready  and  proceed  up  the 
Potomac  as  far  as  Matthias  Point. 
No  doubt  many  a  courier  fled  to  an- 
nounce the  presence  of  the  armada,  and 
then  the  strategical  object  was  accom- 
plished. As  soon  as  it  was  dark  the 
bows  were  turned  down  the  river,  and 
the  morning  of  the  14th  of  December 
found  the  army  fleet  lying  off  Cherry- 
stone Point.  The  navy  had  already 
sailed,  and  must  have  had  some  twenty- 
four  hours'  start.  Admiral  Porter  has 
since  claimed  that  he  did  not  sail  first. 
It  is  very  probable  the  Admiral  thought 
that,  when  the  army  sailed  up  the  bay 
that  they  had  gone  directly  to  sea. 

About  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  14th  the  Major-General  com- 
manding arrived  on  the  Ben  Deford 
and  directed  the  fleet  to  immediately 
weigh  anchor  and  sail  for  the  point  of 
its  destination.  This  was  a  sight  long 
to  be  remembered.  Few  army  officers 
had  ever  seen  such  a  magnificent  dis- 
play. The  decks  of  the  vessels  were 
crowded  to  witness  this  small  army 
afloat.  Many  an  anxious  inquiry  was 
made  as  to  its   destination,  for,  up  to 


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The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


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this  time,  no  one  appeared  to  know,  al- 
though Wilmington  seemed  to  be  the 
point  selected  by  the  staff  and  other  of- 
ficers who  had  good  opportunities  of 
forming  a  judgment.  After  giving  these 
orders,  General  Butler  sailed  on  in  ad- 
vance of  the  transport  fleet.  Soon  af- 
ter starting,  General  Ames,  wishing  fur- 
ther instructions  in  relation  to  the  sail- 
ing and  rendezvousing  of  the  fleet  now 
temporarily  under  his  command,  de- 
spatched a  staff  officer  in  the  Winans, 
a  North  River  tug-boat,  to  communicate 
with  General  Butler  upon  this  subject. 
This  officer  overtook  the  Ben  Deford 
twenty-five  miles  south  of  Cape  Look- 
out, in  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day. 
He  then  stood  off  to  meet  the  fleet  and 
was  taken  on  board  the  Baltic  at  about 
four  o'clock.  The  transport  fleet  was 
collected  late  in  the  night  of  the  15th, 
twenty-five  miles  due  east  of  Mason- 
boro  Inlet.  Here  the  army  awaited  the 
coming  of  the  navy,  which  did  not  ar- 
rive until  the  afternoon  of  the  18th. 

During  the  whole  of  the  16th  we  were 
drifting  at  sea.  The  ocean  was  smooth, 
and  we  were  experiencing  the  finest 
possible  weather.  General  Butler  stood 
in  toward  the  blockading  fleet,  the 
transport  fleet  remaining  at  Mason- 
boro  Inlet.  The  sea  was  so  calm  that 
he  lowered  his  gig  and  took  a  row  for 
pleasure.  This  weather  continued  up 
to  the  night  of  the  18th  of  December. 
During  these  days  of  delay  every  sol- 
dier who  could  procure  a  hook  and  line 
turned  fisherman  for  the  nonce.  Black- 
fish  were  caught  in  large  numbers. 

On  the  17th  of  December  General 
Ames  started  in  the  Winans  to  report 
to  General  Butler,  who  was  found  with 
the  blockading  fleet  off  Federal  Point. 
Here,  together  with  General  Weitzel 
and  Colonel  Comstock,  on  this  little 
vessel,  he  reconnoitred  Fort  Fisher 
under  fire.  The  information  gained 
was  of  an  important  character. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  Rear- 
Admiral  Porter  with  his  navy  arrived 
off  New  Inlet.  He  determined  to  com- 
mence operations  immediately.  At 
this  time  the  mysterious  torpedo  made 
its  first -appearance.     There  had  been 

VOL.   XXVII.  —  NO.    163.  40 


many  rumors  afloat  regarding  it.  Now 
it  had  actually  arrived,  and  the  Admiral 
gave  orders  to  have  it  exploded  that 
very  night. 

The  effect  of  explosions  at  Erith  and 
Woolwich  in  England,  and  at  City 
Point  on  the  James,  had  suggested  to 
General  Butler  the  use  of  a  torpedo  in 
the  destruction  of  fortifications.  He 
believed  that  the  proper  ignition  of  an 
immense  amount  of  powder  under  the 
walls  of  Fort  Fisher  would  dismount 
the  guns,  explode  the  magazines,  and 
probably  destroy  its  garrison.  He  com- 
municated this  idea  to  Admiral  Porter, 
who  indorsed  the  opinion  of  the  Gen- 
eral. Admiral  Porter  afterwards  said 
that  he  believed  that  the  explosion 
would  destroy  Wilmington  and  Smith- 
ville.  Rear-Admiral  Porter's  General 
Order  No.  70,  dated  North  Atlantic 
Squadron,  Hampton  Roads,  December 
10,  1864,  among  other  things,  contains 
the  following  directions  :  "  It  is  first 
proposed  to  endeavor  tJ  paralyze  the 
garrison  by  an  explosion,  all  the  ves- 
sels remaining  twelve  miles  out  from 
the  bar,  and  the  troops  in  transports 
twelve  miles  down  the  coast  ready  to 
steam  up,  and  be  prepared  to  take  the 
works  by  assault  in  case  the  latter  are 
disabled.  At  a  given  signal  all  the 
bar  vessels  will  run  off  shore  twelve 
miles,  when  the  vessel  with  powder 
will  go  in  under  the  forts.  When  the 
explosion  takes  place,  all  the  vessels 
will  stand  in  shore  in  the  order  marked 
on  the  plan."  The  Admiral  thought  a 
good  deal  would  be  accomplished  by 
the  explosion,  and  also  advised  that  the 
vessels  should  be  run  out  twenty-five 
miles  and  the  steam  drawn,  lest  their 
boilers  should  be  blown  up  by  the  ex- 
plosion. 

The  arrangements  necessary  to  carry 
out  this  enterprise  had  to  be  executed 
by  the  navy.  A  flat-bottomed,  light- 
draught,  worn-out  propeller  of  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  tons,  called  the  Louis- 
iana, was  ordered  to  and  arrived  at 
Hampton  Roads  on  the  30th  of  No- 
vember, 1864.  She  was  subsequently 
altered  to  resemble  a  blockade-runner 
at  Norfolk.  Va.     Under  an   order  of 


626 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[May, 


Admiral  Porter's,  in  which  he  stated 
that  the  chances  were  "  death  or  glory, 
honor  or  promotion,"  Commander  Alex- 
ander C.  Rhind  was  selected  to  execute 
the  plan  for  the  explosion,  which  was 
fraught  with  so  much  danger.  After 
having  changed  the  appearance  of  the 
vessel,  she  was  sent  down  to  Craney 
Island,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elizabeth 
River,  where  she  received  one  hundred 
and  eighty-five  tons  of  powder.  It  was 
placed  on  the  berth-deck  in  fifty-pound 
bags,  also  in  the  coal-bunker,  and  the 
rest  in  the  deck-house.  On  the  13th 
day  of  December,  1864,  a  temporary 
crew  was  placed  on  her,  and  she  was 
towed  to  Beaufort  and  anchored  near 
Shackelford  Banks.  It  was  here  she 
had  thirty  additional  tons  of  powder 
placed  on  board  her.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  18th  of  December  this  im- 
mense torpedo  was  again  towed  by 
the  Sassacus  to  a  point  off  New  In- 
let, arriving  there  a  little  after  dark. 
The  soundings  had  only  been  complet- 
ed on  the  17th  of  December.  How- 
ever, Admiral  Porter  had  already  de- 
termined to  explode  the  powder-boat 
on  the  following  night.  At  about  half 
past  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  of 
the  1 8th  of  December  the  Wilderness 
took  the  torpedo  in  tow  and  stood  in 
toward  Fort  Fisher  for  the  purpose  of 
executing  the  order.  But  the  threaten- 
ing aspect  of  the  weather,  the  disap- 
pearance of  the  lights  on  the  mound, 
induced  Commander  Rhind  to  give  up 
the  enterprise  for  the  night.  At  eight 
o'clock  in  the  evening  General  Butler 
received  a  letter  from  Admiral  Porter 
to  the  effect  that  he  had  already  sent 
the  powder-boat  in  to  have  it  exploded. 
General  Butler  immediately  sent  Gen- 
eral Weitzel  and  Colonel  Comstock  on 
board  the  Malvern  to  ask  a  postpone- 
ment. It  was  evident  that  there  could 
be  no  benefit  derived,  if  the  troops 
could  not  be  landed  and  the  enemy 
prevented  from  gaining  time  to  repair 
damages.  The  A.  D.  Vance  was  then 
despatched  to  countermand  the  order, 
and  met  the  Louisiana  returning  from 
the  fort.  Thus  ended  the  first  attempt 
to  explode  the  torpedo. 


It  was  now  evident  that  the  wind 
was  freshening,  and  all  the  old  salts 
predicted  a  gale.  The  troops  had 
been  ten  days  on  transports.  The 
coal  and  water  was  exhausted  on 
nearly  all  of  them.  This  made  a  re- 
supply  necessary.  Besides  this,  a  gale 
had  arisen  and  was  rapidly  increasing 
to  a  terrific  storm.  As  a  simple  matter 
of  safety  the  army  fleet  was  obliged  to  go 
to  some  port  of  shelter.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th  General  Butler  took  the 
wise  precaution  to  send  a  few  vessels 
into  Beaufort  that  needed  supplies. 
By  the  20th  the  dreadful  storm  had 
burst  upon  the,  vessels  with  all  its  fury. 
Nearly  all  the  transports  were  sent  into 
Beaufort,  N.  C,  for  a  safe  harbor  and 
for  supplies  ;  but  the  stanch  old  Baltic 
pointed  her  prow  to  the  sea,  and  nobly 
rode  out  the  violence  of  the  elements. 
The  navy  also  remained  outside.  One 
small  army  vessel  that  had  not  received 
the  order  to  go  into  Beaufort,  and 
which  had  on  board  a  battery  of  artil- 
lery, came  near  being  lost.  The  men 
in  the  midst  of  the  gale  were  obliged  to 
dismount  the  guns  and  take  the  car- 
riages apart  and  put  them  in  the  bottom 
of  the  vessel,  to  save  her  from  total 
wreck.  General  Butler  accompanied 
his  fleet.  From  this  point  he  sent  a 
staff  officer  to  Admiral  Porter,  to  inform 
him  that  he  would  return  off  New  Inlet 
as  soon  as  he  had  coaled  and  watered, 
certainly  by  the  25th  of  December, 
1864.  Every  one  went  to  work  to  sup- 
ply the  transports  and  to  prepare  them 
again  for  sea  service.  This  was  not 
accomplished  until  the  morning  of  the 
24th  of  December.  These  vessels 
could  not  have  been  resupplied  at  an 
earlier  date,  for  it  was  only  by  the  al- 
most superhuman  efforts  of  the  officers 
of  the  fleet  that  it  was  effected  by  the 
time  mentioned.  In  order  to  water  the 
fleet  they  had  to  send  fifteen  miles  up 
the  railroad.  The  gale  had  not  entirely 
spent  its  fury  until  the  morning  of  the 
23d  of  December. 

While  the  army  was  thus  storm- 
bound in  Beaufort,  without  coal  or  wa- 
ter, Admiral  Porter  determined  to  at- 
tack Fort  Fisher. 


i87i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


627 


The  Admiral,  in  his  report  dated 
North  Atlantic  Squadron,  United 
States  ship  Malvern,  at  sea  off  Beau- 
fort, N.  C,  December  26,  1864,  says: 
"After  the  south  wester,  the  wind 
chopped  around  to  the  westward  and 
gave  us  a  beautiful  spell  of  weather, 
which  I  could  not  afford  to  lose  ;  and 
the  transports  with  the  troops  not  mak- 
ing their  appearance,  I  determined  to 
take  advantage  of  it,  and  attack  Fort 

Fisher  and  its  outworks On  the 

23d  I  directed  Commander  Rhind  to 
proceed  and  explode  the  vessel."  The 
explosion  of  the  powder-boat  was  to 
precede  the  attack  to  be  made  on  the 
following  day  by  the  navy  alone,  for  it 
was  well  known  that  the  army  could 
not  be  present  on  the  24th  day  of  De- 
cember. It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that, 
although  General  Butler  had  suggested 
the  use  of  this  immense  torpedo,  the 
privilege  of  being  personally  pres- 
ent at  its  explosion  should  not  have 
been  at  least  accorded  him.  The  suc- 
cess of  the  enterprise  would  seem  to 
have  demanded  the  presence  of  the 
army,  so  that  in  case  any  of  the  sup- 
posed effects  of  the  torpedo  had  been 
experienced,  it  could  have  been  in  a 
position  to  reap  the  benefits  resulting 
therefrom. 

Is  it  fair  to  presume  that  the  sail- 
ors and  marines  could  have  operated 
against  the  fort,  even  though  its  gar- 
rison were  in  a  demoralized  condition, 
as  effectively  as  the  army,  trained  and 
accustomed  as  it  was  to  this  specialty 
in  warfare  ?  The  Admiral  must  have 
had  the  utmost  confidence  in  the  pow- 
der-boat to  think  that  be  could,  after 
the  explosion,  send  a  few  of  his  ma- 
rines ashore  to  walk  in  and  take  pos- 
session. However,  the  fact  remains 
that  the  army  was  in  Beaufort,  N.  C, 
when  the  Admiral  ordered  Commander 
Rhind  to  explode  the  Louisiana. 

Here  the  powder-boat  again  plays 
an  important  part.  There  had  been 
four  different  appliances  adopted  for 
the  ignition  of  the  powder  :  1.  A  clock- 
work ;  2.  Lighted  candles  with  fuses ; 
3.  Slow  match  ;  and  4.  Firing  the  ship. 
At  about  eleven  o'clock  on  the  night 


of  the  23d  of  December  the  Wilder- 
ness once  more  took  the  mammoth 
torpedo  in  tow  and  started  in  toward 
the  fort.  The  Wilderness  continued 
in  until  she  was  in  six  fathoms  of 
water  when  she  cast  the  Louisiana  off. 
The  powder-boat  then  steamed  on 
alone  until  she  was  about  eight  hun- 
dred and  fifty  yards  off  the  northeast 
salient  of  the  fort,  where  she  was 
anchored.  (See  Colonel  Comstock's 
map.)  On  the  other  hand,  General 
Whiting  estimates  this  distance  to 
have  been  "between  twelve  (12)  and 
fifteen  hundred  (1500)  yards,  not  near- 
er." (See  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  p.  106.)  Here  a  few  minutes  were 
spent  in  making  the  final  arrangements 
to  explode  the  powder.  The  firing 
party  then  repaired  to  the  deck  of  the 
Wilderness,  which  vessel  ran  out  about 
twelve  miles  to  sea  and  awaited  the 
effect  of  the  explosion.  Commodore 
Rhind  in  his  report  says  that  "  at  pre- 
cisely 1.40  A.  M.  the  explosion  took 
place,  the  shock  being  hardly  felt,  and 
four  distinct  reports  heard.  What 
result  was  occasioned  near  the  vessel 
we  can  only  estimate  by  the  feeble  fire 
of  the  forts  next  day.  My  opinion  is 
that,  owing  to  the  want  of  confinement 
and  insufficient  fusing  of  the  mass, 
much  of  the  powder  was  blown  away 
before  ignition,  and  its  effect  lost.  The 
fuses  were  set  by  the  clocks  to  one  hour 
and  a  half,  but  the  explosion  did  not 
occur  till  twenty-two  minutes  after  that 
time  had  elapsed,  the  after  part  of  the 
vessel  being  then  enveloped  in  flames." 
Beyond  all  peradventure  the  powder 
was  ignited  by  the  fire  that  had  been 
made  in  the  stern  of  the  boat  as  a 
dernier  ressort  for  burning  the  powder 
and  to  prevent  the  vessel  from  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  pow- 
der should  have  been  exploded  by  the 
clocks  at  twenty  minutes  past  one.  But 
the  explosion  did  not  take  place  until 
about  a  quarter  to  two  o'clock ;  then,  as 
all  the  spectators  admit,  the  stern  of 
the  boat  was  completely  wrapped  in 
flames,  "the  last  thing  they  did  being 
to  set  her  on  fire  under  the  cabin,"  ac- 
cording: to  Admiral  Porter.  Howe ver  in- 


628 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[May, 


genious  the  machinery  for  the  ignition 
of  the  fuses  was,  it  is  almost  certain 
that  it  did  not  perform  its  part.  Even 
if  fuses  were  set,  they  never  were  prop- 
erly laid.  They  were  only  run  into  the 
upper  and  outer  bags  in  the  deck-house. 
Holes  were  then  merely  bored  through 
the  deck  to  the  powder  below.  If 
the  Gomez  fuses  had  been  interlaced 
through  every  layer,  as  General  Butler 
advised,  a  very  different  result  would 
have  been  accomplished.  The  omission 
to  run  the  fuses  through  the  bags  of 
powder  below  the  decks  was  a  serious 
error.  Lieutenant-Commander  Jeffers 
states  in  his  report  (see  Report  of  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Fort 
Fisher  Expedition,  p.  250)  that  it  had 
been  suggested  to  use  the  Beardslee 
Electro-Magnetic  Machine  and  wires  to 
explode  the  powder,  but  that  "  it  was  not 
favorably  considered  by  those  charged 
with  the  execution  of  the  plan."  There 
must  have  been  a  mismanagement  in 
the  preparation  of  the  appliances  by 
which  the  powder  was  to  be  ignited. 
Every  candid  person  must  admit  that 
the  experiment  was  not  properly  made. 
The  consequence  was  that  a  very  small 
part  of  the  powder  was  ever  burnt ;  the 
remainder  either  went  down  with  the 
wreck  or  was  blown  into  the  ocean. 
Therefore  the  theory  of  General  Butler, 
that  an  immense  torpedo  like  that  of 
the  Louisiana  would,  if  properly  ex- 
ploded near  an  enemy's  fortification, 
destroy  it  and  paralyze  the  garrison, 
has  never  yet  been  tested.  It  may 
be  stated  in  this  connection  that,  had 
General  Butler's  plan  been  followed,  the 
torpedo  would  have  been  run  in  upon 
the  beach  before  firing  it.  No  per- 
son can  estimate  what  would  have 
been  the  effect  of  the  ignition  of  two 
hundred  and  ten  tons  of  powder  under 
the  walls  of  Fort  Fisher.  The  failure 
was  not  in  the  conception  of  the  plan, 
but  in  its  execution.  Another  great 
error  was  in  attempting  to  explode  the 
powder  at  such  an  early  part  of  the 
night.  Even  if  the  effects  hoped  for  had 
been  accomplished,  the  enemy  would 
have  had  ample  time  for  recovery  and 
repairs.    Could  there  have  been  a  more 


inauspicious  time  selected,  not  only 
the  hour  of  the  night,  but  in  the  absence 
of  the  army  ?  The  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War  found  that  "  the 
time  for  the  explosion  was  not  such, 
in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  as 
was  proper  to  allow  all  the  results 
which  would  have  been  attained  by  a 
more  complete  explosion  to  have  been 
taken  advantage  of  by  the  co-operating 
land  force."  Every  one  must  recollect 
that  but  a  small  part  of  the  powder 
was  really  exploded,  and  the  fort  was 
not  materially  injured. 

The  grand  naval  attack  which  had 
been  preceded  by  the  attempted  ex- 
plosion of  the  powder-boat  was  made 
on  the  following  day. 

Admiral  Porter  says  :  "  At  daylight 
on  the  24th  the  fleet  got  under  way 
and  stood  in,  in  line  of  battle.  At 
11.30  A.  M.  the  signal  was  made  to 
engage  the  forts,  the  Ironsides  leading, 
and  the  Monadnock,  Canonicus,  and 
Mahopac  following.  The  Ironsides 
took  her  position  in  the  most  beautiful 
and  seamanlike  manner,  got  her  spring 
out,  and  opened  deliberate  fire  on  the 
fort,  which  was  firing  at  her  with  all 
its  guns,  which  did  not  seem  numer- 
ous in  the  northeast  face,  though  we 
counted  what  appeared  to  be  seventeen 
guns  ;  but  four  or  five  of  these  were 
fired  from  that  direction,  and  they  were 
silenced  almost  as  soon  as  the  Iron- 
sides opened  her  terrific  battery.  The 
Minnesota  then  took  her  position  in 
handsome  style,  and  her  guns,  after 
getting  the  range,  were  fired  with  ra- 
pidity, while  the  Mohican,  Colorado, 
and  the  large  vessels  marked  on  the 
plan,  got  to  their  stations,  all  firing  to 
cover  themselves  while  anchoring.  By 
the  last  of  the  large  vessels  anchored 
and  got  their  batteries  into  play,  but 
One  or  two  guns  of  the  enemy  were 
fired,  this  fen  d'enfer  driving  them  all 
to  their  bomb-proofs ;  .  .  .  .  the  battle 
became  general ;  .  .  .  .  such  a  torrent  of 
missiles  were  falling  into  and  bursting 
over  it  [the  fort]  that  it  was  impossible 

for  any  human  being  to  stand  it 

But  when  they  all  got  into  place  and 
commenced  work  in  earnest,  the  shower 


i87i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


629 


of  shell  (one  hundred  and  fifteen  per 

minute)  was  irresistible Our  men 

were  at  work  at  the  guns  five  hours, 
and  glad  to  get  a  little  rest."  (See 
pages  123,  124,  and  125,  Report  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.) 
The  fire  of  the  navy  on  this  attack  was 
as  rapid  as  on  any  of  the  following 
days.  The  navy  must  have  fired  away 
about  half  of  its  ammunition  on  this 
day,  because,  at  the  end  of  the  bom- 
bardment on  the  25th,  Captain  Breese 
told  General  Weitzel  that  the  navy  had 
not  sufficient  ammunition  to  continue 
in  case  the  army  would  elect  to  re- 
main on  shore.  Admiral  Porter  says  in 
his  report  of  the  bombardment  of  the 
25th  December,  "As  the  ammunition 
gave  out  the  vessels  retired  from  ac- 
tion." And  in  a  letter  to  General  But- 
ler dated  the  26th  of  December,  1864 : 
"  I  have  ordered  the  largest  vessels  to 
proceed  off  Beaufort  and  fill  up  with 
ammunition,  to  be  ready  for  another  at- 
tack." It  is  apparent  that  the  ammuni- 
tion used  on  the  24th  of  December  con- 
tributed little  to  the  objects  of  the  ex- 
pedition. The  War  and  Navy  Depart- 
ments had  determined  that  a  combined 
attack  of  the  two  branches  of  the  ser- 
vice was  necessary  for  the  reduction  of 
the  fort.  tThe  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
thought  that  it  was  not  wise  to  even 
attempt  the  capture  of  the  fort  without 
a  co-operating  force  of  the  army.J  It 
does  not  appear  from  whence  Admiral 
Porter  had  received  instructions  to  make 
the  purely  naval  attack  on  the  24th. 
Suppose  that  General  Butler  had  re- 
turned to  Fortress  Monroe  without 
making  an  effort  in  the  direction  of 
the  object  of  the  expedition,  would  it 
not  have  been  the  duty  of  Admiral 
Porter  to  postpone  his  attack  until  he 
had  the  necessary  co-operating  army 
force  near  the  scene  of  operations  and 
ready  to  land  ?  What  would  the  coun- 
try have  said  if  General  Butler,  while 
lying  off  Fort  Fisher  waiting  for  the 
navy,  during  the  first  days  of  beautiful 
weather  which  preceded  the  storm, 
had  determined  to  take  advantage  of 
it  and  attack  ?  The  navy  had  no  more 
right  to  attack  without  the  army,  than 


the  army  would  have  had  to  attack 
without  the  navy.  Still,  the  Admiral 
says  that  he  determined  to  attack.  It 
is  very  true  that  he  states  in  his  let- 
ter to  Secretary  Wells,  dated  January 
21,  1865,  "  In  a  conversation  with 
General  Grant  I  expressly  told  him 
that  I  wanted  nothing  to  do  with  Gen- 
eral Butler."  Notwithstanding  this  ad- 
mission, it  would  be  a  very  serious 
charge  to  make  against  the  Admiral 
that  he  did  not  wish  General  Butler 
present  when  he  made  his  attempt  to 
take  the  stronghold.  General  Butler, 
on  the  other  hand,  seemed  to  have 
taken  great  precaution  that  the  en- 
tente cordiale  should  be  maintained 
between  the  army  and  navy.  Admiral 
Porter,  although  the  junior  officer,  sent 
his  fleet  captain  to  confer  with  General 
Butler  instead  of  going  himself,  while 
the  General  twice  called  upon  the  Ad- 
miral at  Fortress  Monroe  on  business 
connected  with  the  expedition.  How- 
ever, after  the  navy  was  once  ready  to 
commence,  there  seemed  to  be  a  desire 
to  push  ahead,  regardless  of  the  army. 
The  commanding  officer  of  the  navy 
seemed  to  say,  "  Here  I  am  off  Fort 
Fisher,  all  prepared  to  attack,  and  de- 
termined to  go  on  ;  I  am  going  to  take 
this  fort  myself;  if  the  army  wants  to 
participate  in  the  glory  that  will  attend 
the  achievement,  it  must  hurry  up,  or 
it  will  be  too  late;  if  the  fort  succumbs 
to  the  fire  of  my  navy,  I  will  send  a 
handful  of  my  marines  ashore  and  re- 
ceive its  surrender."  The  officers  and 
men  on  board  the  Baltic,  which  vessel 
had  remained  at  sea,  crowded  her 
decks  in  wonderment,  gazing  at  the 
terrific  fire  on  the  fort,  and  asking  them- 
selves what  advantage  was  to  be  gained 
by  it,  while  the  troops  which  had  been 
deemed  necessary  to  take  the  fortifica- 
tion were  so  many  miles  away.  Dur- 
ing the  bombardment  the  fort  replied 
at  long  intervals  in  a  sullen  and  de- 
termined manner.  There  was  no  per- 
ceptible change  in  the  appearance  of 
the  fort,  for  it  proved,  on  its  capture, 
that  the  heavy  shots  had  struck  in  its 
sides  and  buried  themselves  in  the 
sand,  which  had  fallen  back  to  its  place 


630 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[May, 


and  refilled  the  breaches  made  by  the 
projectiles.  On  Saturday  morning,  the 
24th  of  December,  General  Butler  was 
first  informed  at  Beaufort,  N.  C,  that 
the  powder-boat  had  been  exploded  on 
the  previous  night  at  about  a  quarter 
before  two  o'clock.  After  ordering  his 
transports  to  follow  him,  he  started  for 
and  arrived  off  New  Inlet  between  four 
and  five  p.  M.,  in  time  to  see  the  end  of 
the  first  day's  bombardment.  A  staff 
officer  was  sent  on  board  to  confer  with 
Admiral  Porter,  but  he  returned  word 
that  he  was  too  much  fatigued  to  give 
them  audience,  but  would  receive  Gen- 
eral Weitzel  and  Colonel  Comstock 
early  in  the  morning.  At  half  past  six 
o'clock,  Sunday  morning,  General  Weit- 
zel repaired  on  board  the  Malvern, 
with  instructions  from  General  Butler 
to  urge  the  Admiral  to  run  by  the  fort 
into  Cape  Fear  River.  To  this  prop- 
osition Admiral  Porter  did  not  accede. 
General  Grant  had  said  on  this  subject 
to  General  Weitzel  :  "Weitzel,  this  is 
to  be  madeanother  Mobile  affair.  The 
navy  will  run  some  of  their  vessels 
into  the  Cape  Fear,  and  I  would  advise 
you  to  land  your  troops  and  take  a 
position  across  the  peninsula,  and  then 
Fort  Fisher  and  these  works  will  fall 
exactly  as  Fort  Morgan  did." 

There  were  a  number  of  captured 
blockade-runners  in  the  fleet  that  had 
been  fitted  up  as  gunboats.  It  had 
been  thought  that  these  vessels  might 
have  been  utilized  in  this  undertaking, 
but  the  Admiral  decided  otherwise,  and 
the  idea  of  making  this  another  Mo- 
bile affair  was  abandoned.  Preparations 
were  now  made  to  recommence  the 
bombardment,  and  if  possible  to  effect 
a  landing  of  the  troops.  The  transports 
had  continued  to  arrive  during  the 
night,  and  by  the  morning  of  the  25th 
of  December  were  in  their  proper  posi- 
tion off  New  Inlet.  At  about  eight  A.  M. 
the  navy  formed  in  line  of  battle,  the 
Ironsides  leading  in  the  attack  and  the 
monitors  following.  The  firing  from 
the  vessels  was  a  great  deal  slower  on 
this  day  than  on  the  day  before.  It 
was  half  past  one  in  the  afternoon  be- 
fore the  Flag  Pond  Battery  was  entirely 


silenced,  and  arrangements  were  com- 
pleted by  the  naval  brigade,  under 
command  of  Brigadier-General  C.  K. 
Graham,  to  commence  the  landing  of 
the  troops.  To  cover  this  landing 
the  Brooklyn  and  seventeen  gunboats 
opened  fire  on  the  strip  of  woods  just 
back  of  the  beach  which  hid  the  enemy 
from  our  view.  They  also  sent  boats 
to  the  troops  and  rendered  every  assist- 
ance they  could.  It  was  a  grand  sight 
to  see  the  Brooklyn  open  her  broad- 
sides. The  enemy  did  not  seem  to  rel- 
ish the  fire,  and  soon  retreated  and  al- 
lowed the  army  to  make  their  landing 
without  further  resistance,  but  not  until 
they  had  sent  a  few  shots  whistling 
through  the  rigging  of  the  Ben  Deford 
and  the  Baltic  and  other  vessels  of  the 
army  fleet.  The  landing  was  effected  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Flag  Pond  Battery, 
which  was  situated  about  three  miles 
north  of  Fort  Fisher.  Five  hundred 
men  of  General  Curtis's  brigade  of 
General  Ames's  division  were  the  first 
troops  to  land  on  the  beach,  General 
Curtis  being  the  first  man  to  touch  the 
land.  As  this  successful  disembarka- 
tion took  place,  a  prolonged  cheer  went 
up  from  the  decks  of  the  transports. 
By  the  energetic  efforts  of  General 
Graham  the  remainder  of  Curtis's  bri- 
gade was  speedily  and  handsomely 
landed.  Skirmishers  were  thrown  out 
into  the  woods  in  front  to  cover  the 
disembarkation  which  continued  to 
take  place.  General  Curtis  immedi- 
ately formed  his  brigade  and  marched 
toward  the  fort  along  the  sea-beach. 
As  this  brigade  approached  Flag  Pond 
Battery  the  garrison  ran  up  the  white 
flag  of  surrender.  The  troops  pushed 
on  rapidly  through  the  sand,  for  they 
were  naturally  anxious  to  take  the 
prisoners.  However,  ere  this  could  be 
effected  a  boat  was  sent  ashore  and  the 
garrison,  to  the  number  of  sixty-five 
men,  carried  off  on  board  of  the  Santi- 
ago de  Cuba.  These  prisoners  be- 
longed to  the  17th  North  Carolina 
Regiment,  which  regiment  our  troops 
had  left  in  front  of  their  lines  near 
Richmond,  Va.,  before  starting  upon  the 
expedition.     By  the  time  Curtis's  bri- 


i8;i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


631 


gade  had  been  landed  and  formed,  it 
was  quite  evident  that  the  surf  was 
rapidly  becoming  heavier ;  already 
many  boats  were  swamped.  It  was 
with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  ammu- 
nition could  be  got  through  the  surf 
without  becoming  damaged.  Still  the 
disembarkation  continued.  By  three 
o'clock  a  large  number  of  the  boats 
had  been  overturned  either  in  passing 
through  the  surf  to  the  shore  or  in  at- 
tempting to  return  through  it  to  the 
ships.  Although  by  repeated  efforts 
many  were  righted,  still  some  of  them 
were  hopelessly  lost.  One  boat  was  so 
suddenly  overturned  that  a  number  of 
men  were  caught  under  it.  It  was 
some  time  before  they  could  be  res- 
cued. None  of  the  men  after  three 
o'clock  reached  the  shore  without  get- 
ting a  thorough  drenching.  The  men 
struggled  gallantly  with  the  elements, 
and  all  that  nerve  and  strength  could 
do  was  done  in  order  to  get  the  boats 
through  the  still  rapidly  rising  surf. 
By  the  Herculean  efforts  of  all,  the  most 
of  Pennypacker's  brigade  was  landed 
and  marched  forward  to  support  Cur- 
tis, who  in  the  mean  time  had  been 
pushed  up  to  the  attack.  The  sand 
being  very  deep,  the  marching  was 
necessarily  slow.  It  was  an  utter  im- 
possibility to  march  the  men  on  the 
double-quick. 

On  its  way  up  to  the  fort  General 
Curtis's  brigade  captured  a  battalion 
-  of  North  Carolina  Junior  Reserves, 
numbering  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men  under  the  command  of  a  major, 
who  had  been  sent  out  of  the  fort  be- 
cause there  were  not  a  sufficient  number 
of  bomb-proofs  there  to  contain  them. 
They  had  been  ordered  to  remain  out- 
side the  works  during  the  day  and  to 
return  at  night  after  the  fire  of  the 
navy  had  ceased.  This  is  an  impor- 
tant fact.  It  seems  to  prove  that  there 
must  have  been  a  garrison  large  enough 
to  man  the  parapet  of  the  fort  without 
drawing  upon  these  reserves.  This, 
taken  together  with  the  other  facts, 
clearly  shows  that  there  was  a  well- 
disciplined  garrison  within  the  walls 
always  ready  to  man  the  parapet  and 


palisade  as  soon  as  the  bombard- 
ment should  end.  These  prisoners 
were  sent  off  on  board  the  transports. 
While  Curtis's  brigade  was  preparing 
for  the  assault,  some  of  the  men  came 
upon  a  line  of  telegraph,  the  wires  of 
which  were  cut.  They  also  captured  a 
Rebel  mail-bag.  The  letters  were 
written  by  members  of  the  senior  re- 
serves to  their  families  about  domestic 
matters,  and  to  prominent  men  asking 
for  their  influence  to  get  retired  from 
further  military  duty.  Curtis  marched 
resolutely  on,  but  notwithstanding  his 
great  efforts  to  force  march  his  men, 
the  day  was  fast  growing  to  an  end 
before  he  had  advanced  his  skirmishers 
up  to  the  fort  and  found  himself  in 
position  to  charge.  This  line  was 
pushed  up  to  within  two  hundred  yards 
of  the  fort,  the  garrison  being  kept  in 
their  bomb-proofs  by  the  fire  of  the 
navy.  Ten  men  were  wounded  at  this 
time  by  our  own  shells.  Immediately 
upon  the  cessation  of  the  fire  of  the 
navy,  the  garrison  of  the  fort  remanned 
the  works  and  the  palisade.  The  land 
front  had  only  two  of  its  guns  dis- 
abled, and  the  fort  was  "  substantially 
uninjured  as  a  defensive  work."  The 
enemy  opened  on  our  skirmish  line  and 
fired  through  the  loopholes  of  the  pali- 
sade. General  Butler  in  his  report 
dated  Head-quarters  Department  of 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  December 
25,  1864,  says  that  "it  was  evident  as 
soon  as  the  fire  of  the  navy  ceased,  be- 
cause of  darkness,  that  the  fort  was 
fully  manned  again  and  opened  with 
grape  and  canister  upon  our  picket 
line."  It  would  have  been  temerity  to 
order  a  charge  at  this  time. 

The  following  are  statements  made 
by  General  Whiting,  the  Rebel  com- 
mandant of  the  fort,  just  previous  to 
his  death,  in  reply  to  a  series  of  ques- 
tions framed  by  General  Butler  and 
bearing  upon  the  subject  of  the  strength 
and  reinforcement  of  the  garrison  of 
Fort  Fisher,  and  likewise  upon  the  ef- 
fect of  the  bombardment.  It  is  a  fact 
that  these  answers  were  not  given  un- 
der oath  ;  still  they  were  made  by  a  man 
in   the   solemnity   of  his   approaching 


632 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[May, 


death,  and  therefore  "  will  carry  the 
force  of  moral  truth  and  certainty,  al- 
though not  in  the  form  of  judicial  evi- 
dence." 

''  "  Five  (5)  companies  of  the  36th 
Regiment  North  Carolina  troops,  and 
Adams's  Light  Battery,  amounting  to 
six  hundred  and  sixty-seven  (667)  aggre- 
gate, was  the  number  of  the  garrison 
at  Fort  Fisher  on  the  16th,  17th,  and 
18th  of  December  last." 

"On  the  23d,  one  hundred  and  ten 
men,  veteran  artillery  of  the  10th  Reg- 
iment North  Carolina  troops,  fifty  sail- 
ors and  the  7th  Battalion  Junior  Re- 
serves, about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
strong,  were  thrown  into  the  fort." 

"  Question  13.  Please  state  whether 
any  part,  and  if  so,  how  much  of  the 
damage  done  to  the  fort  by  the  fire  of 
the  navy  was  repaired  during  the  night? 

"Answer.  Casualties  first  day: 
killed,  none  ;  wounded,  one  (1)  mor- 
tally, three  (3)  severely,  and  nineteen 
(19)  slightly  ;  total,  23.  Five  (5)  gun- 
carriages  disabled. 

"  Second  day :  killed,  three  (3) ; 
wounded,  nine  (9)  mortally,  six  (6)  se- 
verely, and  twenty-eight  (28)  slightly; 
total,  46.  Damage  but  very  slight ;  one 
(1)  10-inch,  two  (2)  32-pounder,  and 
one  (1)  8-inch  carriages  disabled,  and 
one  (1)  10-inch  gun  disabled.  Damage 
repaired  at  night.  Enemy's  fire  for- 
midable and  sustained,  but  diffuse,  un- 
concentrated.  Apparent  design  of  the 
fleet  to  silence  the  channel  batteries,  in 
order  to  force  an  entrance  with  his  ves- 
sels, and  not  to  attack  by  land. 

"The  garrison  was  in  no  instance 
driven  from  its  guns,  and  fired  in  re- 
turn, according  to  orders,  slowly  and 
deliberately,  six  hundred  and  sixty-two 
(662)  shot  and  shells. 

"Question  14.  By. reason  of  the  ces- 
sation of  the  bombardment  at  night, 
were  you  not  able  to  rest  and  recruit 
your  garrison  ? 

"Answer.  We  were  able  to  do  both. 

"Question  15.  At  the  time  of  the 
landing,  where  was  the  supporting  force, 
if  any,  to  the  fort? 

"  Answer.  Assembling  at  Sugar  Loaf 
as  fast  as  Hoke's  people  arrived." 


"Question  17.  At  the  time  our  skir- 
mish line  was  deployed  before  the  fort, 
what  was  the  condition  of  the  guns  and 
defences  upon  the  land  side  as  to  effi- 
ciency for  a  defensive  purpose  ?  " 

"Answer.  The  guns  and  defences 
on  the  land  front  were  in  perfect  order 
at  the  time  referred  to,  except  two  (2) 
disabled  guns  on  the  left ;  nineteen 
guns  in  position  ;  palisade  in  perfect 
order  and  the  mines  the  same,  the 
wires  not  having  been  cut." 

"Question  18.  In  view  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  fort  and  its  garrison,  would 
it  have  been  possible  with  either  three 
(3)  or  six  (6)  thousand  men  to  have 
taken  the  work  by  assault  ?  (Note. — 
In  answering  this  question,  please  give 
as  many  of  the  details  for  the  reason 
you  may  give  as  possible.) 

"Answer.  Possible,  yes.  Probable, 
no.  The  work  was  very  strong,  the 
garrison  in  good  spirits  and  ready  ;  and 
the  fire  on  the  approaches  (the  assault- 
ing column  having  no  cover)  would 
have  been  extraordinarily  heavy.  In 
addition  to  the  heavy  guns,  I  had  a 
battery  of  Napoleons,  on  which  I  placed 
great  reliance.  The  palisade  alone 
would  have  been  a  most  formidable 
obstacle."  (See  pages  iv  and  v,  Report 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War.) 

Before  this  immense  stronghold,  un- 
injured as  it  really  was,  stood  Curtis's 
brigade  ;  an  isolated  band  of  twelve 
hundred  men  on  a  narrow  strip  of 
land,  with  an  enemy  in  their  rear. 
General  Ames  says  in  his  report, 
"  Upon  the  report  of  Brevet  Brigadier- 
General  Curtis  that  he  could  take  the 
fort,  I  sent  his  brigade  forward  to  make 
the  attempt."  Even  the  gallant  Curtis 
did  not  deem.it  wise  to  take  the  respon- 
sibility to  assault,  although  he  had  per- 
mission from  General  Ames  to  do  so. 
To  have  attacked  with  such  an  inad- 
equate force  would  and  could  have  only 
resulted  in  disaster  and  defeat.  This 
brigade  constituted  all  the  troops  that 
were  within  charging  distance  of  the 
fort.  General  Ames  strained  every 
nerve  to  get  Pennypacker's  brigade 
up  in  time,  but  it  could  not  be  accom- 


i8;i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


633 


plished.  Colonel  Pennypacker  could 
not  have  reinforced  General  Curtis,  un- 
til late  in  the  night,  and  before  this 
the  enemy  would  have  made  an  attack 
upon  their  rear.  There  was  no  line,  as 
there  was  in  the  second  expedition, 
run  across  the  land  to  guard  against  an 
attack  from  the  direction  of  Wilming- 
ton. From  the  first  prisoners  General 
Butler  learned  that  two  brigades  of 
Hoke's  division  of  Rebel  troops  were 
in  the  woods  near  the  point  of  our 
landing.  The  remainder  of  the  divis- 
ion continued  to  arrive  from  Wilming- 
ton, to  which  place  they  had  been  or- 
dered, after  leaving  the  position  occu- 
pied by  them  in  front  of  General  Butler 
near  Richmond.  The  storm  that  was 
fast  coming  up  might  drive  off  the 
navy,  and  then  the  small  body  of  our 
troops  on  shore  would  soon  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  Confederates.  Gen- 
eral Whiting  makes  the  following  state- 
ment on  the  subject :  — 

"  Question  21.  In  view  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  weather  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  demonstration  of  the  25th 
of  December,  and  in  view  of  the  force 
that  might  have  concentrated  upon 
the  peninsula  as  well  above  as  be- 
low the  place  of  landing,  would  it, 
in  your  judgment,  have  been  possible 
for  six  thousand  men  without  artillery 
to  have  held  out  there,  without  being 
captured  or  overwhelmed,  from  the  26th 
of  December  to  the  15th  of  January  ? 

"  Answer.  No  ;  and  it  is  a  matter 
of  grave  charge  against  General  Bragg 
that  the  whole  force  was  not  captured 
on  the  26th  of  December.  He  had  the 
force  and  the  position. 

"  Question  24.  Would  you  have 
deemed  it  the  part  of  wisdom  on  the 
part  of  the  commander  of  the  Federal 
forces  to  have  exposed  his  troops  in 
the  situation  referred  to  in  question 
twenty-one  ? 

'■'■Answer.  I  do  not.  Neither  attack 
was  practicable  in  the  presence  of  the 
supporting  force,  provided  that  had 
been  under  a  competent  otficer.  The 
first  landing  ought  assuredly  to  have 
been  captured  entirely ;  and  as  for  the 
second,  although  deriving  much  great- 


er advantages  from  the  different  mode 
of  attack  by  the  fleet,  and  though 
pressed  with  great  vigor,  it  is  due  to 
the  supineness  of  the  Confederate  gen- 
eral that  it  was  not  destroyed  in  the 
act  of  assault."  (See  Report  of  Com- 
mittee on  Conduct  of  War,  pages  vi 
and  vii.) 

The  greatest  number  of  men  ever  on 
shore  was  about  twenty-three  hundred, 
and  of  that  number  there  were  not 
more  than  twelve  hundred  in  position 
to  assault.  If  the  disembarkation  had 
continued  uninterruptedly,  it  is  possi- 
ble that  General  Ames's  division  of 
three  thousand  men  might  have  been 
placed  on  shore.  But  there  would  have 
been  no  hope  of  reinforcements  from 
the  fleet,  for  the  surf  would  have  cut 
off  all  communication  with  the  fleet, 
as  it  really  did  for  over  thirty  hours. 
While  our  troops  would  have  been  in 
this  dangerous  position,  the  enemy 
could  have  reinforced  to  any  extent. 
General  Whiting,  in  the  answer  to  the 
committee  before  referred  to,  says  :  — 

"  Question  19.  Please  state  whether, 
with  a  force  holding  the  beach,  from  the 
nature  of  the  ground  and  from  the  con- 
figuration of  the  channel  of  Cape  Fear 
River,  it  would  have  been  possible  for 
the  Confederates  to  have  reinforced  or 
provisioned  the  fort  to  any  extent  ? 

"Answer.  No  difficulty  at  all  by  the 
river."  (See  Report  of  Committee  on 
Conduct  of  War,  page  vi.) 

After  General  Curtis's  brigade  had 
marched  down  the  beach  and  Penny- 
packer's  had  been  partially  landed, 
General  Butler,  on  board  of  the  Cham- 
berlain, ran  down  to  a  point  about  five 
hundred  yards  from  Fort  Fisher  and 
near  the  position  occupied  by  the  mon- 
itors. Here  he  met  General  Weitzel, 
who  stated  that  he  thought  it  impossi- 
ble to  make  a  successful  assault  upon 
the  fort.  General  Butler  was  convinced, 
by  reason  of  the  state  of  the  weather, 
that  the  fort  should  be  immediately  at- 
tacked or  that  the  small  portion  of  the 
troops  landed  should  be  withdrawn. 
He  then  ordered  Colonel  Comstock, 
who  was  on  board  with  him,  to  jump 
into  a  boat  with  General  Weitzel,  pull 


634 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[May, 


ashore,  and  examine  with  General 
Weitzel  and  report  to  him  if  an  assault 
is  possible.  "  To  me,"  he  said,  "  it  does 
not  look  possible,  but  I  am  unwilling 
to  give  it  up." 

At  the  same  time  General  Graham 
reported  to  General  Butler :  "  General, 
you  have  got  either  to  provide  for  those 
troops  to-night  on  shore  some  way,  or 
get  them  off;  because  it  is  getting  so 
rough  that  we  cannot  land  much  long- 
er." General  Butler  says  :  "  General 
Graham  had  been  a  naval  officer,  but 
is  now  in  the  service  of  the  army  and 
commanding  the  naval  brigade.  Con- 
sidering a  few  moments,  I  determined 
the  course  of  action  that  should  govern 
me.  A  storm  was  coming  on  ;  the 
surf  was  rolling  in ;  the  barometer  had 
fallen  half  an  inch.  If  we  got  the  men 
on  shore,  it  might  be,  and  probably 
would  be,  a  week  before  we  could  send 
an  ounce  of  provisions  to  them.  In 
the  mean  time  a  deserter  from  the  62d 
North  Carolina,  whom  I  captured  once 
before  at  Hatteras,  in  the  early  part  of 
the  war,  having  received  good  treat- 
ment, came  in.  He  said  that  they  had 
marched  down  from  Richmond,  and  that 
Kirkland's  brigade  and  another  brigade 
were  already  down  there  ;  and  that 
Hoke  was  on  his  way  with  large  rein- 
forcements and  had  arrived  at  Wilming- 
ton the  night  before.  I  then  made  up 
my  mind  what  to  do  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  a  storm  was  coming  on,  and  if  it 
became  necessary  to  effect  a  landing 
again  we  could  do  it  any  day  in  two 
hours  without  the  loss  of  a  man.  I 
thought  it  a  great  deal  better  to  risk 
that  than  to  risk  the  attempt  to  get  the 
men  on  shore  and  intrench  them." 

General  Butler  then  adds,  that :  "  I 
sent  to  him  (Admiral  Porter)  and  asked 
what  could  be  done.  He  sent  me  word 
that  he  had  not  an  hour's  ammunition, 
and  that  he  must  go  to  Beaufort  to  re- 
plenish his  ships."  (See  pages  23,  24, 
and  25,  Report  of  Committee  on  Con- 
duct of  the  War.) 

The  Major  -  General  commanding, 
having  maturely  considered  all  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  position,  determined  to 
extricate   his   army   from   its    perilous 


situation  and  ordered  a  re-embarkation 
of  his  troops.  It  was  nearly  dark  when 
this  order  was  given.  The  naval  bri- 
gade and  the  boats  from  the  navy  all 
vied  with  each  other  in  their  efforts  to 
get  all  the  men  off  the  beach  that  night. 
But  at  about  nine  o'clock  that  evening 
it  was  impossible  to  get  any  boats 
through  the  surf,  and  therefore  the 
greater  part  of  Curtis's  brigade  had  to  / 
be  left  on  the  beach,  near  the  pointy 
where  they  had  landed  in  the  morn- 
ing without  food  or  shelter.  The  rain 
fell  and  the  wind  blew  in  on  the  shore 
all  that  night.  Only  one  boat  passed 
through  the  surf  on  Sunday.  There 
were  the  troops  on  the  barren  beach 
before  us  in  plain  view,  but  all  the  as- 
sistance that  could  be  rendered  was  to 
cover  them  by  the  fire  of  the  navy. 
Gunboats  were  sent  to  their  relief  with 
orders  to  keep  up  an  uninterrupted  fire 
upon  the  woods  in  rear  of  our  troops, 
who  had  improvised  an  intrenchment 
to  fight  behind  in  case  the  Rebels  un- 
dertook to  make  them  prisoners.  The 
enemy  could  never  have  captured  that 
body  of  men,  small  as  it  was,  without  an 
overwhelming  force,  for  they  were  part 
of  the  picked  men  of  General  Ames's 
division,  who  afterwards  charged  and 
carried  Fort  Fisher  by  assault.  These 
troops  were  not  all  safely  re-embarked 
until  Monday,  the  27th  of  December. 
The  enemy  did  not  seem  to  make  an 
effort  to  prevent  this.  Most  of  the 
transports  were  sent  North  on  Sunday, 
but  General  Butler  and  the  remaining 
vessels  did  not  leave  until  Monday. 
The  Major-General  commanding  did 
not  reach  the  head-quarters  Army  of 
the  James  until  late  in  the  night  of 
the  28th  of  December.  It  was  a  day 
or  so  after  this  before  all  the  troops 
had  returned  to  their  former  camps. 

General  Butler,  in  causing  a  with- 
drawal of  the  troops  that  he  had  landed 
on  the  beach,  acted  under  the  advice 
of  two  engineer  officers,  than  whom  no 
more  skilled  and  learned  members  of 
their  profession  held  commissions  in 
the  United  States  Army.  With  respect 
to  the  motives  which  prompted  this 
withdrawal     General     Weitzel    said  : 


i8;i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


635 


"After  that  experience  (in  assaulting 
military  works),  with  the  information 
I  had  obtained  from  reading  and  study, 
—  for  before  this  war  I  was  an  instructor 
at  the  Military  Academy  for  three  years 
under  Professor  Mahan, — rand  in  face 
of  the  fact  that  I  had  been  appointed  a 
major-general  only  twenty  days  before, 
and  needed  confirmation  ;  notwith- 
standing all  that,  I  went  back  to  Gen- 
eral Butler,  and  told  him  I  considered 
it  would  be  murder  to  order  an  attack 
on  that  work  with  that  force.  I  under- 
stood Colonel  Comstock  to  agree  with 
me  perfectly,  although  I  did  not  ask 
him,  and  General  Butler  has  since  said 
that  he  did 

"  Question.  Upon  deliberation,  and 
after  all  you  have  since  learned,  are 
you  entirely  satisfied  with  the  opinion 
you  then  formed  about  attacking  the 
fort  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir,  I  am  fully  satis- 
fied, from  all  I  have  heard  since,  from 
the  result  of  the  second  attack,  and 
everything  else,  —  I  am  fully  satisfied 
that  I  did  my  duty  there."  (See  page 
iii,  Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct 
of  the  War.) 

Colonel  Comstock  also  gave  the  fol- 
lowing testimony  before  the  same  com- 
mittee :  — 

"  Question.  With  the  information  that 
General  Weitzel  had,  would  you  have 
agreed  with  him,  independent  of  what 
General  Curtis  said  to  you  ? 

"  Answer.  I  should,  from  the  infor- 
mation I  had  at  that  time."  (See  page 
iv,  Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of 
the  War.) 

A  gallant  officer  and  a  few  men,  un- 
der the  fire  of  the  navy  guns,  approached 
so  near  to  the  fort  as  to  carry  off  a  flag 
which  had  been  cut  down  by  a  shell, 
and  was  hanging  over  the  parapet. 
"  Thinking  that  probably  the  Rebels 
had  not  observed  it,  he  crept  upon  his 
hands  and  knees  to  the  palisading, 
found  a  hole  in  it  that  one  of  the  shells 
had  made,  crept  through  the  hole  and 
up  to  the  flag,  and  got  it  and  got  away 
with  it,  without  being  observed."  (See 
Report  of  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  p.  77.)    But  "  this  was  done 


while  the  shells  of  the  navy  were  falling 
about  the  heads  of  the  daring  men  who 
entered  the  works."  Had  Curtis's  bri- 
gade charged  through  this  fire  of  the 
navy,  and  had  they  been  successful  in 
getting  possession  of  a  portion  of  the 
fort,  still  this  would  have  been  but  the 
beginning  of  their  task  ;  for  it  is  known 
from  experience  with  the  same  garri- 
son in  the  second  expedition,  that  they 
would  have  been  obliged  to  fight  after 
they  got  into  the  fortification  itself. 
The  whole  of  General  Ames's  division 
did  fight  this  identical  garrison,  some- 
what reinforced,  inside  of  the  fort,  on 
the  second  expedition,  for  nearly  seven 
hours,  before  there  were  indications 
that  the  Rebels  contemplated  giving 
up  the  battle  as  lost.  There  can  be 
but  little  doubt  that,  had  Curtis  charged 
at  the  time,  unsupported  as  he  was,  he 
would  have  lost  the  most  of  his  bri- 
gade. On  the  first  expedition  the 
army  had  only  three  and  one  half  hours 
of  favorable  weather  to  land  and  make 
the  necessary  arrangements  to  charge 
this  stronghold  of  the  Rebellion.  The 
second  expedition  were  accorded  three 
days  of  uninterruptedly  beautiful  weath- 
er. The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War  gave  the  question  as  to  the 
refusal  of  the  Major-General  command- 
ing the  army  forces  to  assault  Fort 
Fisher  a  thorough  and  complete  ex- 
amination. The  testimony  covers  over 
two  hundred  and  sixty  pages  of  printed 
matter,  and  after  the  most  mature  delib- 
eration the  Committee  found  as  fol- 
lows :  "  In  conclusion,  your  committee 
would  say,  from  all  he  testimony  before 
them,  that  the  determination  of  General 
Butler  not  to  assault  the  fort  seems  to 
have  been  fully  justified  by  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  then  known  or  after- 
wards ascertained." 

In  his  instructions  to  General  Butler 
the  Lieutenant-General  directed  as  fol- 
lows :  "  The  object  of  the  expedition 
will  be  gained  on  effecting  a  landing  on 
the  mainland  between  Cape  Fear  River 
and  the  Atlantic,  north  of  the  north  en- 
trance to  the  river.  Should  such  land- 
ing be  effected,  whether  the  enemy 
hold  Fort  Fisher  or  the  batteries  guard- 


636 


Our  Eyes,  and  how  to  take  care  of  them. 


[May, 


ing  the  entrance  to  the  river  there,  the 
troops  should  intrench  themselves,  and 
by  co-operating  with  the  navy  effect 
the  reduction  and  capture  of  those 
places."  General  Butler  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  unmindful  of  these  in- 
structions. He  did  not  believe  that  he 
had  effected  such  a  landing  as  was  con- 
templated in  General  Grant's  letter  to 
him.  There  were  sixty -five  hundred 
men  belonging  to  the  army  branch  of 
the  expedition.  Out  of  this  number 
there  were  only  about  twenty  -  three 
hundred  men  landed.  There  were  very 
few  supplies,  no  artillery,  and  little  am- 


munition placed  on  shore.  This  force 
amounted  to  about  one  third  of  the 
troops,  and  they  were  without  the  ne- 
cessary supplies.  This  was  merely  a 
partial  landing.  General  Butler  ex- 
plained his  reason  for  withdrawing  his 
forces  in  the  following  words:  "By 
going  away  I  would  draw  off  the  ene- 
my's attention.  If  I  remained  there,  it 
would  keep  his  forces  concentrated  at 
that  point ;  and  if  I  was  driven  away 
by  the  storm  that  was  coming  up,  then 
I  should  lose  the  men  I  had  landed. 
I  acted  for  the  best,  according  to  the 
light  I  had." 

H.  C.  Lock-wood. 


r 


m/ 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER. 


SECOND   EXPEDITION. 


THE  first  expedition  against  Fort 
Fisher  failed  to  capture  the  fort,  but 
it  acted  as  a  successful  reconnoissance 
by  which  information  of  the  most  im- 
portant character  was  obtained.  When 
the  first  attempt  was  made,  it  was  sup- 
posed by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
and  the  Lieutenant-General  that  the 
navy  could  run  the  batteries  and  iso- 
late the  Rebels.  Admiral  Porter  de- 
cided, in  the  light  of  his  experience  on 
the  first  expedition,  that  this  was  im- 
practicable. The  second  expedition 
enjoyed  all  the  benefits  of  the  expe- 
rience gained  by  the  failure  of  the  first, 
and  it  sailed  to  execute  certain  definite 
instructions.  Its  action  was  not  to  de- 
pend upon  the  result  of  reconnoissance 
or  experiment.  Immediately  upon  the 
receipt  of  the  news  announcing  the  un- 
successful character  of  the  first  expe- 
dition, Secretary  Welles,  at  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  President,  telegraphed 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  requesting 
him  to  order  the  return  of  a  force  suffi- 
cient to  render  certain  the  fall  of  the 


defences  of  the'  port  of  Wilmington. 
True  to  that  tenacity  of  purpose  which 
always  characterized  the  action  of  Gen- 
eral Grant  throughout  the  whole  Re- 
bellion, he  immediately  ordered  that 
preparations  be  made  to  re-embark  the 
troops  for  another  attempt,  in  co-op- 
eration with  the  navy,  to  carry  these 
strongholds,  so  useful  to  the  life  of  the 
Confederacy  and  so  dangerous  to  the 
success  of  the  Union  arms. 

On  the  ist  day  of  January,  1865, 
Major-General  Benjamin  F.  Butler  and 
Brevet  Major-General  Alfred  H.  Terry 
had  an  extended  interview  with  Lieu- 
tenant -  General  U.  S.  Grant,  at  his 
head-quarters  at  City  Point,  Va.  It 
was  here  determined  that  the  second 
expedition  should  be  intrusted  to  the 
command  of  General  Terry.  On  the 
2d  of  January  orders  were  issued  to 
the  troops  that  were  to  take  part  in  the 
enterprise,  and  on  the  night  of  the  3d 
they  were  marched  to  Bermuda  Hun- 
dreds, where  they  were  embarked  on 
ocean  transports,  under  the   direction 


I87i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


685 


of  Colonel  George  S.  Dodge  of  the 
Quartermaster's  Department.  On  the 
morning  of  the  5th  of  January  the  fleet 
was  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  in  readi- 
ness to  sail. 

The  army  force  consisted  of  the 
same  troops  which  composed  the  first 
expedition,  together  with  the  Second 
Brigade  of  the  Third  Division  of  the 
Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps,  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  J.  C.  Abbott  of 
the  Seventh  New  Hampshire  Volun- 
teers ;  Battery  E,  Third  United  States 
Artillery,  under  the  command  of  Lieu- 
tenant Myrick  ;  a  siege  train  ;  a  detail 
of  artillerists  ;  and  a  company  of  engi- 
neers. These  troops  taken  together 
numbered  about  eighty-five  hundred 
men.  There  were  twenty-one  first  and 
second  class  transport  steamers,  and  a 
third  class  of  small  vessels  and  tenders. 
General  Terry  made  his  head- quarters 
on  the  McClellan,  General  Ames  on 
the  Atlantic,  and  General  Paine  on  the 
Champion.  On  the  morning  of  the  6th 
of  January  this  fleet  sailed  under  sealed 
orders.  Everything  seemed  to  have 
been  admirably  and  expeditiously  man- 
aged. On  opening  the  orders,  the  point 
of  destination  was  found  to  be  twenty- 
five  miles  off  Beaufort,  N.  C.  Here  the 
army  fleet  once  more  found  that  of  the 
navy,  which  had  withdrawn  to  this 
point.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  this 
expedition  to  experience  a  gale  almost 
equal  in  fury  to  that  which  the  first  en- 
countered. This  heavy  weather  com- 
menced immediately  after  the  sailing 
of  the  fleet,  and  continued  until  the 
nth  of  January.  Some  of  the  vessels 
had  become  scattered,  and  others  driv- 
en into  Beaufort,  and  delays  were  occa- 
sioned, so  that  it  was  not  until  the 
morning  of  the  12th  that  Admiral  Por- 
ter steamed  out  and  led  the  fleets  in 
the  direction  of  New  Inlet.  This  day 
was  a  beautiful  one,  and  the  Atlantic 
had  the  appearance  of  an  immense 
placid  lake.  At  about  ten  o'clock  in 
the  evening  both  fleets  came  to  anchor 
at  a  point  five  miles  north  of  Fort 
Fisher.  Early  on  the  following  morn- 
ing the  Brooklyn,  the  double-enders, 
and  other  gunboats   opened  a  fire   on 


the  woods  directly  in  the  rear  of  the 
position  upon  which  it  was  decided  to 
land  the  troops.  The  first  troops  were 
landed  on  the  beach  about  four  miles 
north  of  New  Inlet.  Pickets  were 
thrown  out  in  every  direction.  The 
enemy  did  not  make  any  opposition  to 
this  movement.  In  fact,  not  a  single 
shot  was  fired  at  our  troops  at  this 
time.  During  this  day  eighty-five  hun- 
dred men  were  landed,  with  forty  rounds 
of  ammunition,  six  days'  hard  bread  in 
bulk,  and  three  hundred  thousand  ad- 
ditional rounds  of  small  arms  ammuni- 
tion. The  landing  was  accomplished 
amid  the  greatest  ^enthusiasm  of  the 
soldiers.  Cheer  upon  cheer  went  up, 
clearly  indicating  their  splendid  morale. 
The  surf  gave  some  trouble  at  first, 
but  it  seemed  to  subside  as  the  day 
progressed.  This  favorable  condition 
of  the  surf  continued  through  the  three 
days  of  active  operations  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  accomplishment  of  the  ob- 
ject of  the  expedition.  Paine's  division 
of  colored  troops  having  been  success- 
fully disembarked,  it  was  marched  a 
short  distance  toward  the  fort,  and  then 
directed  across  the  peninsula  to  the 
Cape  Fear  River.  After  the  line  had 
been  established  across  this  narrow 
strip  of  land,  the  troops  threw  up  a 
strong  intrenchment  from  the  ocean  to 
the  river  and  facing  Wilmington.  It 
was  undoubtedly  General  Terry's  ob- 
ject to  prepare  himself  against  an  attack 
from  that  direction.  It  was  well  known 
that  Hoke's  division  of  Rebel  troops 
had  been  relieved  from  Richmond  and 
transferred  to  the  defences  of  Wilming- 
ton about  the  22d  of  December,  1864. 
This  division  probably  numbered  about 
four  thousand  men,  and  would  undoubt- 
edly have  attacked  the  army  forces,  had 
they  believed  that  there  were  no  earth- 
works in  their  front.  Colonel  Abbott's 
brigade  also  formed  a  part  of  this  line. 
On  the  14th  of  January  Captain  Lee's 
and  Lieutenant  Myrick's  batteries  were 
landed,  and  placed  in  position  on  the 
line  already  described.  In  this  way 
General  Adelbert  Ames  was  left  free  to 
operate  against  the  fort,  without  any 
fears  of  an  attack  upon  his  rear.     The 


686 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[June, 


enemy  would  have  had  to  destroy  a 
division  and  a  brigade  of  troops  before 
they  could  interfere  with  this  more  di- 
rect attack.  On  the  14th  the  first  bri- 
gade of  Ames's  division  was  moved  up 
toward  the  fort,  while  the  other  two 
brigades  were  held  in  reserve.  The 
skirmishers  were  advanced  to  within 
one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  the 
work.  In  doing  this  an  outwork  was 
captured,  and  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
made  to  turn  the  guns  against  the  main 
fortification.  Active  preparations  were 
continued  for  the  bloody  conflict,  which 
finally  took  place  on  the  following  day. 
On  the  entire  13th  and  14th  the  navy 
maintained  a  tremendous  bombardment 
of  the  fort.  The  Admiral  had  adopted 
a  different  plan  of  attack,  which  seemed 
to  be  successful  in  materially  dam- 
aging the  fortification.  On  the  even- 
ing of  the  14th  General  Terry  went 
on  board  of  the  Malvern  to  arrange 
with  Admiral  Porter  the  plan  of  attack 
for  the  next  day.  The  Admiral  says 
(see  page  189,  Report  of  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War) :  "  It  was  ar- 
ranged between  the  General  and  my- 
self that  the  ships  should  all  go  in 
early,  and  fire  rapidly  through  the  day, 
until  the  time  for  the  assault  to  come 
off.  The  hour  named  was  five  p.  m.  I 
detailed  sixteen  hundred  sailors  and 
four  hundred  marines  to  accompany  the 
troops  in  the  assault,  the  sailors  to 
board  the  sea  face,  while  the  troops  as- 
saulted the  land  side."  The  following 
are  among  the  directions  that  were  given 
to  the  sailors  and  marines  to  regulate 
them  in  their  landing  upon  the  beach, 
and  in  their  assault  upon  the  sea  face 
of  the  fort :  — 

"General  Order  No.  81. 

"  Flag-Ship  Malvern,  January  4,  1865. 

".  .  .  .  That  we  may  have  a  share  in 
the  assault,  when  it  takes  place,  the 
boats  will  be  kept  ready  lowered  near 
the  water  on  the  offside  of  the  vessels. 
The  sailors  will  be  armed  with  cutlass- 
es, well  sharpened,  and  with  revolvers. 
When  the  signal  is  made  to  man  the 
boats,  the  men  will  get  in,  but  not  show 
themselves.     When  signal  is  made  to 


assault,  the  boats  will  pull  around  the 
stern  of  the  monitors  and  land  right 
abreast  of  them  and  board  the  fort  on 
the  run  in  a  seaman-like  way."  (See 
page  198,  Report  of  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War.) 

"  Landing  Order. 

"  Flag-Ship  Malvern, 
Off  New  Inlet,  January  15,  1865. 

" ....  No  move  is  to  be  made  for- 
ward until  the  army  charges,  when  the 
navy  is  to  assault  the  sea  or  southeast 
face  of  the  work,  going  over  with  cut- 
lasses drawn  and  revolvers  in  hand. 
The  marines  will  follow  after,  and  when 
they  gain  the  edge  of  the  parapet  they 
will  lie  flat  and  pick  off  the  enemy  in 
the  works.  The  sailors  will  charge  at 
once  on  the  field-pieces  in  the  fort  and 
kill  the  gunners.  The  mouths  of  the 
bomb-proofs  must  be  secured  at  once, 
and  no  quarter  given  if  the  enemy  fire 
from  them  after  we  enter  the  fort.  Any 
man  who  straggles  or  disobeys  orders 
is  to  be  sent  to  the  rear  under  a  guard. 
The  men  must  keep  their  flags  rolled 
up  until  they  are  on  top  of  the  parapet 
and   inside    the    fort,    when   they   will 

hoist  them If,  when  our  men  get 

into  the  fort,  the  enemy  commence  fir- 
ing on  Fort  Fisher  from  the  mound, 
every  three  men  will  seize  a  prisoner, 
pitch  him  over  the  walls,  and  get  be- 
hind the  fort  for  protection,  or  into  the 
bomb-proofs."  (See  pages  194  and 
195,  Report  of  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War.) 

Sunday,  the  15th  day  of  January,  1865, 
proved  to  be  a  bright  and  beautiful 
day.  The  air  was  mild  and  balmy  as  a 
May  day.  The  sun  shed  its  bright 
rays  upon  the  scene  through  a  cloud- 
less sky.  What  little  wind  there  was 
blew  off  shore  flattening  the  surf  and 
ocean  to  a  calm  seldom  experienced 
off  the  coast.  But  this  was  not  to  be  a 
day  of  rest  for  the  boys  in  blue  on  sea 
or  shore  before  Fort  Fisher.  The 
storm  of  human  conflict  was  soon  to 
burst  forth. 

Early  in  the  morning  General  Ames, 
at  the  head  of  Bell's  and  Pennypacker's 


i87i.] 


The  CapUire  of  Fori  Fisher. 


6S7 


brigades  of  his  division,  took  up  his 
line  of  march  toward  the  fort.  As  this 
advance  was  made,  the  Tallahassee, 
a  Rebel  gunboat  in  the  Cape  Fear  Riv- 
er, opened  fire  upon  this  body  of  men. 
A  number  of  officers  and  men  were 
killed  and  wounded  ;  a  captain  was 
obliged  to  have  his  leg  amputated. 
This  vessel  was  soon  afterward  driven 
off  and  did  not  make  her  appearance 
again.  Immediately  upon  the  arrival 
of  Pennypacker's  brigade,  directly  in 
front  of  the  fort,  the  First  Brigade  was 
moved  forward  in  line  of  battle  to  a 
new  position  about  two  hundred  yards 
from  the  fort ;  the  right  resting  near 
the  Cape  Fear  River,  and  the  left  ex- 
tending toward  the  ocean  and  parallel 
to  the  front  of  the  fort,  and  covering 
one  half  its  land  face.  The  skirmish- 
ers were  about  a  hundred  yards  in 
advance  of  this  line.  This  movement 
had  to  be  executed  under  a  sharp  mus- 
ketry fire  and  an  occasional  discharge 
of  grape  and  canister.  The  Second 
Brigade,  under  command  of  Colonel 
Pennypacker,  was  now  moved  forward, 
also  in  line  of  battle,  to  a  position  of 
five  hundred  yards  from  the  fort  and 
parallel  to  the  line  formed  by  the 
First  Brigade.  The  Third  Brigade, 
under  command  of  Colonel  Bell,  was 
formed  in  a  similar  manner  about  seven 
hundred  yards  from  the  fort.  This 
column  of  brigades  was  formed  on 
the  open  sandy  beach,  directly  in  front 
of  the  land  face  and  opposite  the  west- 
erly side  of  the  fort.  The  men  were 
moved  up  quickly,  and  as  soon  as  they 
•were  properly  placed,  they  threw  up 
small  rifle-pits  for  temporary  protec- 
tion. While  these  operations  were 
taking  place,  General  Terry  and  staff 
and  General  Ames  and  his  staff  occu- 
pied a  prominent  position  near  an  old 
earthwork  about  five  hundred  and  fifty 
yards  from  the  fort.  General  Ames 
gave  a  personal  supervision  to  every 
detail  of  these  preliminary  manoeuvres  ; 
going  himself,  and  sending  his  staff  to 
the  front  and  to  the  flanks  in  order  to 
correct  and  establish  the  lines  of  at- 
tack. All  these  evolutions  were  exe- 
cuted with  the  precision  and  order  of  a 


parade.  At  this  time  a  number  of 
brave  men  volunteered  to  go  forward  in 
advance  of  the  skirmishers  and  cut 
away  the  palisade.  They  were  pro- 
vided with  axes  for  this  purpose.  In 
the  mean  time,  while  these  operations 
of  the  army  had  been  going  on,  a  force 
of  sailors  and  marines,  numbering  two 
thousand  men,  were  landed  on  the  sea- 
beach  under  the  command  of  Fleet 
Captain  K.  R.  Breese.  The  head  of 
this  column  had  been  pushed  up  to 
within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  fort, 
by  means  of  a  succession  of  intrench- 
ments  and  rifle-pits,  which  were  prompt- 
ly occupied  by  the  United  States  Ma- 
rine Corps.  The  navy  had  kept  up  its 
terrific  fire  upon  the  fort.  Neverthe- 
less at  no  time  was  it  entirely  silenced. 
The  Ironsides  and  monitors  hurled  forth 
their  immense  projectiles  ;  the  grand 
old  frigates  boomed  out  their  heavy 
broadsides  ;  and  the  gunboats  poured 
in  their  whistling  shots  upon  the 
doomed  stronghold.  Probably  the  fire 
of  the  navy  was  not  so  rapid  as  on 
some  of  the  previous  days  of  the  at- 
tack, but  it  was  certainly  far  more  ac- 
curate and  effective.  It  was  the  won- 
der of  the  army  artillerists  to  see  how 
it  was  possible  for  ships  at  sea  to  direct 
an  artillery  fire  with  such  precision. 
By  means  of  army  signals,  General 
Terry  was  in  continued  conversation 
with  Admiral  Porter,  who  was  over  a 
mile  distant.  In  this  way  the  navy 
were  requested  to  direct  their  fire 
either  against  the  parapet  or  against  the 
palisade.  By  this  time  the  assault- 
ing column  of  soldiers,  sailors,  and 
marines,  numbering  about  five  thou- 
sand two  hundred  men,  were  in  readi- 
ness to  charge.  If  Abbott's  brigade, 
which  was  brought  up  toward  the  close 
of  the  action,  be  counted,  then  the  as- 
saulting column  numbered  in  the  ag- 
gregate six  thousand  three  hundred 
men.  At  half  past  three  o'clock  the 
signal  was  given  to  the  navy  to  cease 
firing.  At  the  instant  the  steam  whis- 
tles shrieked  out  this  signal,  Gener- 
al Curtis,  who  commanded  the  first 
line,  sprang  to  his  feet  and  shouted  the 
order  of  advance  to  his  brigade.     With 


688 


The  Capttcre  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[June, 


a  wild  cheer  his  men  charged  forward  ; 
many  passing  through  the  apertures  in 
the  palisade,  across  the  ditch  and  up 
to  the  parapet,  the  rest  charging  across 
a  bridge  which  led  around  to  the  left 
and  rear  of  the  fort.  This  charge  was 
under  the  direction  of  a  staff-officer  of 
General  Ames,  who  was  the  first  man 
on  the  parapet  of  the  fort,  and  was 
stricken  down,  severely  wounded,  while 
planting  a  color  on  the  top  of  one  of 
the  traverses.  Three  other  members 
of  his  staff  were  struck  at  this  time  ;  of 
these  Captain  Dawson  afterward  died 
of  his  injuries.  The  Second  Brigade 
was  now  ordered  forward  and  success- 
fully entered  the  fort.  The  most  of 
this  brigade  entered  by  the  bridge  al- 
ready mentioned.  The  planks  were 
torn  up,  leaving  the  soldiers  to  cross 
upon  the  string-pieces.  At  this  junc- 
ture Colonel  Pennypacker  was  so 
seriously  wounded  that  his  life  was 
despaired  of  for  many  months.  This 
charge  of  the  two  brigades  was  met  by 
the  enemy  with  a  vigorous  resistance. 
They  sprang  to  their  guns  and  fought 
with  desperation,  contesting  each  trav- 
erse and  bomb-proof  inch  by  inch.  A 
half-hour's  fighting  gave  the  army 
possession  of  about  five  or  six  of 
the  immense  traverses  and  also  a  firm 
footing  to  the  left  and  rear  of  the  fort. 

The  brave  sailors  and  marines  at  the 
signal  had  rushed  to  the  attack.  They 
met  with  a  murderous  grape  and  canis- 
ter and  musketry  fire.  Their  ranks 
were  rapidly  thinned  beneath  the  fear- 
ful storm  of  iron,  but  the  survivors 
pressed  bravely  forward  to  close  up  the 
gaps.  Great  gallantry  was  displayed  by 
the  officer  who  led  these  men  into  the 
"deadly  breach."  Lieutenants  B.  H. 
Porter  and  S.  W.  Preston  were  instantly 
killed.  They  had  been  classmates  and 
messmates,  they  had  been  captured  and 
suffered  imprisonment  together,  and  at 
last  died  fighting  side  by  side.  Cap- 
tain Breese,  in  his  report,  says:  — 

"  Finding  the  rear  of  the  men  re- 
treating, I  hastened  toward  it  to  form 
them  under  cover,  and  have  them  use 
their  rifles,  but  they  were  too  far  dis- 
tant for  me  to  reach  them,  and  I  ac- 


cordingly returned  to  a  position  near 
the  works.  As  I  did  so  the  remaining 
men,  notwithstanding  all  attempt  to 
stop  them,  fled,  with  the  exception  of 
about  sixty,  among  whom  were  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander James  Parker,  C. 
H.  Cushman,  T.  O.  Selfridge,  and  M. 
Sicard,  and  Lieutenant  N.  H.  Farquhar 
and  R.  H.  Lamson,  the  latter  of  whom 
was  wounded,  and  several  volunteer 
officers  whose  names  I  unfortunately 
do  not  know.  The  fire  of  the  enemy 
was  so  severe  that  the  few  of  our  men 
remaining  had  to  seek  such  cover  as 
they  could,  and  there  remained  until 
dark,  when  a  demonstration  upon  the 
part  of  the  Rebels  induced  all  to  make 
a  rush,  and  most  succeeded  in  escap- 
ing." (See  page  193,  Report  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War.) 

This  part  of  the  assaulting  column, 
having  been  driven  back  in  confusion, 
was  not  again  brought  in  requisition 
against  the  fort.  In  the  latter  part  of 
the  fight  they  were  rallied  to  man  the 
position  out  of  which  Colonel  Abbott's 
brigade  was  moved.  The  sailors  did 
all  that  could  have  been  expected  of 
them.  They  had  not  been  properly 
armed  for  such  service.  Cutlasses  and 
revolvers  may  be  the  suitable  weapons 
to  arm  men  with  for  the  purpose  of 
boarding  a  vessel  at  sea,  where  the 
fighting  is  necessarily  confined  to  a 
small  space,  but  they  will  not  do  for  an 
attack  upon  a  strong  fortification,  de- 
fended by  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  First  and  Second  Brigades  of 
General  Ames's  division  had  been  gal- 
lantly fighting  all  this  time  inside  of 
the  fort.  The  troops  had  gained  by 
their  desperate  valor  a  number  of  the 
traverses  and  had  advanced  across 
the  west  part  of  the  terre-plein  almost 
to  the  centre  of  the  fort.  General 
Curtis,  who  had  been  conspicuous 
throughout  the  day  for  his  bravery  and 
coolness,  fell,  badly  wounded  by  a  can- 
ister shot.  Colonel  Bell's  brigade  was 
then  advanced.  His  manly  form  was 
seen  at  the  head  of  his  column,  as  it 
darted  forward  over  the  bridge  and  into 
the   fort.     But  this  was  the  Colonel's 


i8;i.] 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


689 


last  charge,  for  at  this  point  the  brave 
and  noble  soldier  fell,  mortally  wounded. 
His  brigade  was  moved  forward  against 
the  sea  face  of  the  fort.  The  ground 
over  which  the  brigade  had  to  charge 
was  obstructed  by  the  debris  of  the 
barracks,  while  the  enemy  was  pro- 
tected by  the  traverses  and  magazines. 
The  navy  had  recommenced  their  fire 
upon  the  sea  face,  after  the  repulse  of 
the  sailors  and  marines.  This  fire  as- 
sisted in  sweeping  the  traverses  for  the 
advance  of  the  men.  It  ceased  at  dark, 
and  was  again  reopened  for  a  short 
time,  but  it  was  soon  found  that  the  fire 
was  killing  and  wounding  our  own  men. 
It  was  therefore  finally  discontinued. 
The  impetuous  resistance  of  the  garri- 
son would  not  permit  darkness  to  cause 
a  cessation  of  hostilities.  The  fearful 
encounter  was  continued.  The  enemy 
kept  up  a  continual  artillery  fire  from 
the  mound  upon  the  soldiers  who  held 
the  western  part  of  the  fort.  The  burst- 
ing of  shell,  the  rattling  of  musketry, 
shouts  of  the  men,  groans  of  the  wound- 
ed, all  went  to  make  up  a  perfect  Pande- 
monium. 

General  Ames,  who  had  entered  the 
fort  at  the  head  of  the  Second  Brigade, 
remained  there  fighting  with  his  men 
until  the  close  of  the  action.  He  had 
been  made  particularly  conspicuous,  not 
only  by  the  prominent  and  advanced 
position  he  had  occupied,  but  by  a 
brigadier-general's  full  dresscoat,  which 
he  wore  on  that  day.  It  was  next  to  a 
miracle  to  see  him  go  unscathed,  while 
his  officers  and  men  were  continually 
falling  by  his  very  side.  There  he 
stood  among  his  troops.  No  advice  to 
retreat,  no  request  to  postpone  the  en- 
gagement until  the  following  morning, 
found  a  listening  ear  with  him.  "  Ad- 
vance, drive  the  enemy  from  their 
works,"  was  his  repeated  order.  To 
his  determined  bravery  and  skill  on 
this  occasion  the  country  owes  more 
than  to  any  other  one  officer  either  in 
the  army  or  navy.  Although  the  gar- 
rison was  already  showing  signs  of 
weakness,  still  General  Ames,  wishing 
to  make  "  assurance  double  sure,"  at 
about    eight  o'clock  sent  to   General 

vol.  xxvn.  —  no.  164.  44 


Terry  for  reinforcements.  He  imme- 
diately forwarded  Colonel  Abbott's 
brigade,  which  went  gallantly  to  the 
rescue.  At  the  same  time  General 
Terry,  who  had  continued  to  occupy 
the  position  he  had  held  in  the  first 
part  of  the  assault,  so  that  he  could  be 
in  perfect  communication  with  the  fleet, 
entered  Fort  Fisher.  Abbott's  brigade 
was  formed  near  the  river,  while  a  por- 
tion of  these  reinforcements,  armed  with 
Spencer's  carbines,  were  ordered  to  ad- 
vance on  the  sea  front.  At  about  nine 
o'clock  a  general  assault  was  made,  and 
the  Rebels  retreated  out  of  the  fort 
toward  Battery  Buchanan.  Cheer  after 
cheer  now  rang  out  upon  the  night  air ; 
the  fact  of  the  capture  of  the  fort  was 
signalled  to  the  fleet  almost  immediate- 
ly. The  navy  vessels  sent  up  rockets 
in  celebration  of  the  glorious  event 
In  the  excitement  and  joy  of  the  mo- 
ment, the  killed,  the  dying,  and  the 
wounded  were  apparently  forgotten.   ; — *(«JL> 

Abbott's  brigade  was  now  ordered  to 
advance  upon  Battery  Buchanan.  Here 
General  Whiting  and  Colonel  Lamb 
were  found  both  badly  wounded.  The 
garrison,  to  the  number  of  about  nine- 
teen hundred  men,  surrendered  at  this 
place,  and  were  marched  back  to  the 
vicinity  of  Fort  Fisher.  Thus,  after 
one  of  the  most  stubbornly  fought 
battles  of  the  war,  this  fortification  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Union  forces. 
The  sacrifices  of  the  army,  navy,  and 
marine  corps,  in  killed  and  wounded, 
amounted  to  eight  hundred  men.  The 
Rebel  loss  was  trifling  compared  to  the 
Union. 

In  the  language  of  General  Ames, 
"  the  name  of  every  officer  and  man  en- 
gaged in  this  desperate  conflict  should 
be  mentioned  "  ;  but  space  at  the  pres- 
ent will  not  allow  the  recital  of  the 
sacrifices  and  acts  of  heroism  of  that 
day. 

The  next  morning  a  terrific  explo- 
sion of  the  main  magazine  of  the  fort 
occurred.  By  this  accident,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  men  were  killed  and 
wounded,  and  many  a  brave  man  who 
had  survived  the  conflict  of  the  day  be- 
fore lost  his  life.     It  was  undoubtedly 


690 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 


[June, 


caused  by  some  person  entering  the 
magazine  with  a  light,  without  knowing 
its  nature. 

On  the  night  of  the  16th  of  January, 
the  Rebels  having  lost  the  key  of  the 
position,  blew  up  and  abandoned  Fort 
Casswell  and  the  works  on  Smith's 
Island.  The  United  States  forces  tri- 
umphantly entered  Wilmington,  N.  C, 
on  Washington's  birthday.  ^ 

Every  circumstance  of  the  second 
expedition  was  most  auspicious.  So 
favorable  was  the  weather,  that  constant 
communication  was  kept  up  with  the 
fleet  and  transports,  and  the  navy  was 
accorded  three  successive  days  for 
bombarding  the  fort,  so  that  when  the 
column  moved  to  the  assault  there 
were   but  few  guns    to   oppose  them. 

General  Terry  deserves  the  highest^ 
encomiums  for  the  manner  in  which  he 
prepared  and  organized  all  the  details 
of  the  operations  which  culminated  in 
the  attack  upon  Fort  Fisher.  It  is 
true  that  some  reinforcements  had 
been  thrown  in  the  fort  after  the  first 
attempt  to  carry  it,  but  General  Whit- 
ing has  stated  that  they  were  not  of 
good  material.  (See  page  108,  Report 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.) 

Admiral  Porter's  theory  in  relation  to 
the  force  necessary  to  take  the  fort 
was,  that  after  he  had  bombarded  it, 
any  land  force .  could  successfully  as- 
sault it,  and  when  they  had  carried  the 
parapet,  that  the  garrison  would  capitu- 
late. The  Admiral, makes  use  of  thee 
following  statements  in  describing  the 
events  of  the  first  expedition:  "The 
works  were  battered  and  burnt  to  that 
degree  that  there  appeared  no  life  with- 
in the  walls Until  late  in  the  day 

on  the  26th  the  forts  laid  at  our  mercy, 
and  if  the  men  had  not  been  brcju^ht 
off,  the  Rebels  would  have  surrendered 
when  they  marched  up  and  the  navy 
opened  fire."  (See  Report  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  page  178.) 
"They  (the  forts)  were  so  blown  up, 
burst  up,  and  torn  up,  that  the  people 
inside  had  no  intention  of  fighting  any 

longer There  never  was  a  fort 

that  invited  soldiers  to  walk  in  and  take 
possession  more  plainly  than  Fort  Fish- 


er  We  have  shown  the  weakness 

of  this  work.  It  can  be  taken  at  any 
moment  in  one  hour's  time."  (See  Re- 
port Secretary  of  Navy,  page  51.) 

To  the  superficial  observer  the  final 
capture  of  the  fort  might  seem  to  prove 
the  correctness  of  these  views  ;  but  it 
establishes  the  contrary.  It  appears 
from  the  experience  of  the  second 
expedition  that  assaulting  the  fort 
was  but  half  of  the  work  to  be  done  ; 
for  after  the  troops  had  gained  the  in- 
side and  rear  of  the  fort,  the  fight  con- 
tinued for  over  six  hours.  The  troops 
first  got  possession  of  the  west  part  of 
the  fort,  and  then  the  fight  partook  of 
the  nature  of  a  battle  of  infantry  against 
infantry.  Assaulting  the  fort  was  one 
thing,  capturing  its  garrison  was  an- 
other. This  great  fact  seems  to  have 
been  entirely  lost  sight  of  by  those  who 
believe  that  the  engineer  officers  showed 
timidity  on  the  first  expedition.  How- 
ever, Admiral  Porter  afterwards  changed 
his  mind  materially  on  the  subject  of 
the  strength  of  the  fort  and  the  forces 
necessary  to  carry  it.  In  his  testimo- 
ny before  the  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War  (see  page  190)  he  says  : 
"  I  have  since  visited  Fort  Fisher  and  ' 
the  adjoining  works,  and  find  their 
strength  greatly  beyond  what  I  had 
conceived.  An  engineer  might  be  ex- 
cusable in  saying  they  could  not  be 
captured  except  by  regular  siege.  I 
wonder  even  now  how  it  was  done. 
The  work,  as  1  said  before,  is  really 
stronger  than  the  Malakoff  Tower, 
which  defied  so  long  the  combined 
power  of  France  and  England ;  and 
yet  it  is  captured  by  a  handful  of  men 
under  the  fire  of  the  guns  of  the  fleet, 
and  in  seven  hours  after  the  attack 
commenced  in  earnest." 

Bearing  in  mind  all  the  difficulties 
that  surrounded  the  first  expedition, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  remarkably 
favorable  events  of  the  second,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  General  Butler's  with- 
drawal of  that  part  of  his  troops  which 
had  been  landed,  from  their  exposed 
position  before  the  walls  of  Fort  Fish- 
er was  a  duty  which  he  owed  to  his  / 
soldiers  and  to  his  country. 

H.  C.  Lockwood. 


X 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032744549 

FOR  USE  ONLY  IN 
THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


/ 


' 


